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Change is a dominant theme in world civilization. Empires rise and fall, 
populations revolt and stronger nations impose their will upon weaker ones. When 
western civilization has made contact with other societies, particularly those on the 
African continent, there is a definitively observable tendency of western civilization to 
negatively take advantage of other cultures. Walter Rodney shows that from the slave 
trade, through colonial imperialism and to Africa’s independence era, there is an inequity 
of social, economic and political exchange between Africa and the west.1 
As an extension of this inequity, the continent of Africa appears destined to enter 
the twenty-first century plagued by the question of democratization. Nations that emerged 
from colonialization with socialist and autocratic orientations have been pushed towards 
liberalizing their economies and democratizing their states. This push is seen most visibly 
within the states themselves as marginalized peoples and groups take to the streets and 
protest for more state openness, yet, the widest influence has been exhibited by global 
lending institutions. The current push towards democratization, as a precondition to 
structural adjustment programs and financial assistance, has gained momentum across the 
continent in the last six years. 
1 Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, with an introduction by Vincent Harding 
(Washington: Howard University Press, 1982), 3. 
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When reviewing this phenomenon, Africa’s global position in the contemporary 
eco-political order must be surveyed. Democratization has been increasingly emphasized 
since the dissolution of the cold war. Africa’s geopolitical importance is “no longer 
compelling as formerly in the capitals of the major global powers.”2 The turmoil in 
Eastern Europe means that there is another market competing for assistance dollars with 
Africa and it inevitably lessens the amount Africans will receive. 
African commodities are becoming less important as they are being produced more 
effectively by other developing areas of the world.3 Less international actors wish to lend 
and invest because compared to South Asia for example, Africa’s gross domestic product 
has declined while that of South Asia’s has risen. Export levels have remained flat or 
declined since 1970. For example Africa’s world market share for non-oil primary 
products has dropped from 7 to 4 percent between 1970 and 1985.4 World business 
leaders have expressed a certain lack of interest towards African economies as they would 
like to leave African matters to international financial institutions to salvage. 
Disinvestment has emerged as a new trend. For instance, between 1980 and 1990, 43 of 
139 British firms with industrial investments in Africa withdrew their holdings.5 
2 Richard Sandbrook, The Politics Of Africa’s Economic Recovery (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), 4. 
3 Thomas Callaghy, “Africa and the World Economy: Caught Between a Rock and a Hard 
Place,” in Africa In World Politics , ed. John W. Harbeson and Donald Rothchild (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1991), 40. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid., 41. 
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Africa has become dependent on western donor nations, the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank for monies to boost their economies. The depth of 
this dependence has grown to cumbersome proportions. In 1978 only two African 
nations had agreements with the IMF. By March of 1990, 28 nations were indebted to the 
IMF.6 These external debts mushroomed as aid and loans were used to finance the 
current debts and to facilitate imports. The African Development Bank’s 1992 African 
Development Report records this debt at 264.3 billion dollars. This is 31 % of Africa’s 
imports. This dependence subjects Africa to the economic and political conditionalities of 
structural adjustment programs that aim at liberalizing African states. 
Democratization is a plainly stated goal of western nations and institutions. Barber 
B. Conable, President of the World Bank in 1990 bluntly states that “the development of 
many sub-Saharan African countries has been quite unnecessarily constrained by their 
political systems . . . people need freedom to realize individual and collective potential.”7 
Similarly, Britain’s former foreign secretary Douglas Hurd “asserted that the distribution 
of aid should favor countries tending toward pluralism, public accountability, human rights 
and market principles.”8 In a like sentiment France’s Francois Mitterrand “noted that for 
6 Ibid., 44. 
7 Ibid., 58. 
Ibid. 
4 
him democracy would include free elections, multiparty system, press freedom and an 
independent judiciary.”9 
In hard empirical terms, one could posit that if a state has avenues for 
representation and vehicles for popular participation then that state could drive 
democratically into the future. Indeed, these elements are visible on the African continent. 
The majority of African nations are struggling with democratic transitions in one form or 
another. Many nations currently hold provisional or local elections and still have 
entrenched heads of state who show little to no signs of relinquishing power such as Sani 
Abacha in Nigeria and Eyadema in Togo. Others are holding presidential elections and 
have hope for continuing democratic atmospheres such as the newly re-elected Jerry 
Rawlings in Ghana (which will be the focal point of this work) and Benjamin Mkapa’s 
Tanzania, while some nations still transfer political power via the military coup de 'état as 
seen recently in Sierra Leone and Niger. Unfortunately, democracy does not consist of 
electoral methodology alone. Were that so, then the majority of the African continent 
would have functioning democratic systems well in place. The values of the society must 
be accounted for. Its peoples must feel empowered by being able to affect the central 
government to positively change their material conditions. The political apparatus must 
hold elected representatives accountable to the constituants that voted them into office. 
The state bureacracy must be impartial in allocating resources to the citizenry. When 
9 Ibid. 
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these factors are the guiding principles that move the state it is then when democracy may 
be said to exist. 
Statement Of Problem 
The preceding observations raise the question which is the research problem of this 
work: Is western styled democracy adaptable to modem African states? 
This discussion is held within the context of political action in Africa today. When 
discussing the political condition of African states, one is instantly called to review the 
historical causes because Africa’s problems were not bom during the independence period 
of the 1950’s and ‘60’s. The years of turmoil since the independence movement is the 
reflection of centuries of exploitation and injustice perpetrated on Africa by western 
nations. A brief inquiry into the nature of this history will serve to illustrate the causes of 
Africa’s problems today. 
Slavery 
Chief among western injustices is the marketing and sale of African flesh. Africa’s 
future has been indelibly scarred by the African slave trade. Lasting from 1445 to 1870, 
the African slave trade had many negative repercussions, from cultural homicide to 
religious pollution and no the least of these is the loss of population. For over four 
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hundred years this African holocaust resulted in over one hundred million deaths and 
relocations.10 
Walter Rodney explained that a nation’s population and the growth of its labor 
force is directly linked to the extent of its growth and development. “Population growth 
played a major role in European development in providing labor, markets and the 
pressures which led to further advance.”11 African people were quite aware that 
population and development depended upon each other. “Among the Balonta of Guinea- 
Bissau, the family’s strength is represented by the number of hands there are to cultivate 
the land.”12 Global sale of African people for over four centuries interrupted this natural 
development process. 
“ Warfare, trickery, banditry and kidnapping”13 were the principal means for 
obtaining captives and millions were killed so that millions could be taken alive and well to 
work. Walking the many miles to the coast line in ankle and wrist chains cost lives as well 
as the holding periods at the shore. The middle passage itself would claim the lives of 
approximately 25% of the captives and conservative evaluations approximate that ten 
million Africans landed alive in the Americas and Europe.14 As a direct result of the slave 
10 Rodney, 96. 
“Ibid., 97. 
12 Ibid., 98. 
13 Ibid., 95. 
Ibid. 
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trade, Africa’s population was stagnated at times when other populations grew and this 
purposeful depopulation caused African “people to loose their battle to tame and harness 
nature - a battle which is at the basis of development.”15 
Colonialism 
The slave trade is the backdrop that colonialism must be evaluated against. 
Colonial domination introduced Africa to the world capitalist system in a position 
detrimental to any prospect of development as it ensured that African economies are 
import-export oriented rather than production oriented. 
Economic penetration and political control by Europeans into Africa were 
motivated by the interest and needs of the colonizers for raw materials and new markets. 
For Lenin, this imperialism is the highest stage of global capitalism which characterizes the 
world economy. As capitalist economies mature, as capital accumulates and as profits 
grow, capitalist economies are driven to find solutions for their need to expand. One 
solution has been to seize colonies to serve as investment opportunities, new markets and 
sources of primary goods and cheap labor.16 
15 Ibid., 98. 
16 Karl Marx, “Communist Manifesto”, World's Greatest Classic Books [CD-ROM] (Ottawa: 
Corel Corporation, 1995). 
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Deliberate colonial policy, the thirst for primary goods and raw materials for export gave 
birth to the structure of the African economy. It is a structure which obliges Africa to 
keep producing commodities it does not need because its people consume little 
of such goods, while it depends on other people for the production of its own needs. “It 
is a structure of dependency rather than that of self reliance.”17 There developed only a 
very small sector who catered to the consumption needs of the people and were unable 
and often unwilling to provide for the subsistence and employment of the exploited 
peoples. The relatively small size of indigenous industries resulted in the growth of 
underemployment and widespread poverty. Hence the population that did grow after the 
slave trade ended was thrown into the rear section of capitalist economies regulated to 
subsistence farming, illegalities and impoverishment. 
Rajni Kothari states that “the most glaring indictment of the prevailing world 
order is that it is an order that has condemned a large section of mankind to live in poverty 
and degradation and has reduced the states in which they live to conditions of dependence 
and servility.”18 
Once the impact of slavery and the colonial legacy is brought into light, the 
political problems that African nations suffer may be seen in their proper context. It is 
quite unreasonable to expect African nations to appear at independence complete in their 
17 Rajni Kothari, Footsteps Into the Future: Diagnosis of the Present World and a Design for an 
Alternative (New York: The Free Press, 1974), 29. 
18 Ibid., 109. 
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political development. All the societies of the world experienced the problems inherent to 
their infancy. Europe is allowed to have its dark ages without the intellectual accumen of 
its people called into question. Africa’s natural development was retarded so western 
nations could prosper and the history of this purposeful underdevelopment must be 
considered when evaluating African contemporary politics. 
The branches of Africa's political tree are wide and extend far beyond the 
continent’s coast line. Just as Israel is a source of strength and hope for Hebrews across 
the world, Africa could be the inspiration for its entire Diaspora. Should Africa ever stand 
solidly on its own feet politically and exert true economic muscle it would transform the 
lives of Africans everywhere and reconstruct global politics. 
Statement Of Hypothesis 
A comparison of western democratic ideals and the nature of African politics will 
force the hypothesis: western democracy is incompatible with the nature of contemporary 
African states. Western democracy will be specifically defined by the variables of 
individualism, social equity and political democracy. That these three variables have been 
isolated does not negate the presence of other factors (e.g. capitalism, class structure, 
education, etc.) that contribute to sustaining democracy within a polity. Following the 
analysis of Alexis deTocqueville this work asserts that by identifying these three variables 
10 
the foundation of western democracy may be succinctly explained. In describing the 
nature of contemporary African states, this work will turn its attention to the prevalence of 
the social group, the leadership style and the politization of the military. Accepting that 
African politics is a complex continental phenomenon, these three aspects have been 
identified to express common generalities that the aforementioned democratic practices 
may be compared to. Compatibility will be guaged by comparing individualism to the 
social group, social equity to the leadership style and political democracy to the politicized 
military. As such this work offers three sub-hypotheses (a) the prevalence of the social 
group in African politics negates the prospects for individualism; (b) leadership styles that 
reflect patrimonial practices neutralizes social equity within a society and (c) where the 
military is politicized to the point of forcefully intruding into state affairs there can be no 
political democracy. 
Statement Of Purpose 
The purpose of this work will be to place the western democratic template on top 
of Africa's political reality and the resulting inconsistencies will show if these western 
democratic ideals are applicable in the African context. It being clear that African nations 
will have to struggle with the applicability of democracy in their lands, this work will first 
define the terms of the debate itself in chapter 2. Chapter 3 will show that western 
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democracy revolves around three central concepts: individualism, social equity and 
political democracy. Chapter 4 will investigate three aspects of Africa's political 
environment: the pervasiveness of the social group, the leadership style and the politicized 
military. Having established concise standards that define the phenomenon of democracy 
and may be used to judge applicability, chapter 5 will reference the Ghanaian political 
experience specifically to determine which set of variables have found expression there. 
Chapter 6 is where conclusionary statements will be made, particularly a final comparison 
of the six points in question and recommendations will be made for a change in Africa’s 
political systems. 
Statement of Methodology 
It will be the research method of this work to use literature review to gather 
information on the western democratic ideals and the elements of Africa’s political 
environment that will be investigated. This work will similarly refer to secondary sources 
when investigating the political experiences of contemporary Ghana. The concept of 
democracy will be defined to the point of identifying three variables that compose it. This 
work will limit itself to an exploration of individualism, social equity and political 
democracy and juxtapose these elements to variables impacting African politics: social 
grouping, leadership style and politicized military. 
12 
As such this work will utilize a comparative analysis to evaluate three independant 
variables from two political realities to investigate if the western set are applicable to the 
African reality. A comparative analysis relies primarily on case studies of individual 
political systems. This analysis insists that governmental systems may best be understood 
in the total context of their cultural and historical settings, “establishing area studies as an 
interdisiplinary framework for understanding selected world regions.”19 This area 
approach is at the essence of a comparative analysis of political systems. “By combining 
the full range of data provided by history, geography, cultural anthropology, language 
study and empirical observations of government at work,”20 one may gain insight into the 
reasons behind the activity of the political system in question. 
In investigating the African political reality to isolate three variables that may be 
examined, this work will assert that the group approach is most suited to explain African 
political phenomenon. Groups are said to exist when the presence of one or more unifying 
factors causes individuals to bond. “It is used to describe any collection of individuals 
who have some characteristic in common.”21 More specifically, this paper will assert that 
in African systems of government, the interest group has gained dominance. Defined as 
19 Fred W. Riggs, “The Theory of Political Development,” in Contemporary Political Analysis, 
ed. James C. Charlesworth (New York: The Free Press, 1967), 322. 
20 Ibid., 325. 
21 David B. Truman, “A Group Interpretation of Politics,” in Micropolitics: Individual and 
Group Level Concepts, ed. John H. Kessel, George F. Cole and Robert G. Seddig (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1970), 217. 
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“any group that on the basis of one or more shared attributes makes certain claims upon 
other groups in the society for the establishment of forms of behavior that are implied by 
the shared attributes,”22 African interest groups use various means (strikes, 
demonstrations, etc.) to impact their political systems. This activity comprises one 
element of political activity and the group is a quite useful tool in investigating the 
antecedents of this activity. Four immediate reasons for the explanatory value of the 
group are viewable. 1. Group conflict is often thought to be the major explanation for 
political outcomes in society. 2. The number and kind of group memberships within 
society are often thought to have major implications for political system characteristics. 3. 
The groups one is a member of are thought to influence the socialization experiences of 
the individual which correlates group membership to political attitudes and 4. The groups 
one is a member of may influence current attitudes by providing incentives and 
disincentives for conformity to group positions.23 The various types of groups that may be 
found in African societies will be illustrated as well as the points or reasons that they 
assemble. 
Furthermore, the concept of access to the state and its resources will be seen as the 
reason for political activity. Truely access to the institutions that affect peoples lives are 
22 Ibid., 225. 
23 David H. Everson and Joann Poparad Paine, An Introduction to Systematic Political Science 
(Homewood: The Dorsey Press, 1973), 241. 
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the reasons groups gather and the varying degrees to which these groups do or do not 
gain access will comprise the political reality of the nation. Emerging out of this group 
theory, this work will view African leaders and the military as two separate groups vying 
for access to state resources. The definition of the African group and the isolation of 
leaders and the military as two separate groups will provide three variables that may be 
juxtaposed to the western democratic variables. 
Once this work has isolated the six variables that are to be compared, the Ghanaian 
case study will illustrate which set of variables are dominant in a particular African society. 
It is within the African continent’s most authoritarian regimes where the democratization 
experiment is most pressing. Africa’s strongmen have systematically and purposefully 
denied access to state resources to the majority of the citizens of their nations. These 
denied masses have risen most forcefully where repression has been the greatest. The 
need for representation in authoritarian circumstances has been an expressed concern for 
pro-democracy movements continent wide. It is here where the question of the 
applicability of western democracy is most relevant, hence authoritarian regimes are the 
focal point of this work. 
Ghana is chosen as a case study for three reasons. First, the regime of Jerry 
Rawlings from 1981 to 1992 typifies African authoritarianism with one important 
exception. Rather than reflecting the narrow interests of a particular interest group in 
Ghanaian society, Rawlings second incursion arose from a powerbase that drew from a 
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broad section of the populus, primarily the youth discontent with the politics of the status 
quo. Secondly, this paper will assert that foreign lending institutions have greatly 
influenced the push to democratize African politics. Rawlings’ Ghana is held as a model 
of how African nations should implement SAPs. The IMF and international donor nations 
have praised Ghana for its committment to devaluate its currency, privatize industries and 
liberalize its economy even as these changes have had an immediate negative impact on 
Ghana’s citizens. This work opines that being held as such a model, Ghana deserves 
investigatory attention. Lastly, Ghana was the first African nation to rise from colonial 
oppresion and gain independence. As such it was an inspirational trendsetter that gave 
assistance to other African nations in their liberation struggles. The move towards 
democratization has been considered a second independence movement in which African 
peoples are mobilized to affect their material conditions similar to their efforts of the 
1960s. Ghana’s democratization experiment from 1992 to the present could serve as an 
example to other nations just as Ghana’s independence movement did. On the basis of this 
potential this work will use Ghana as an example of how the three western democratic 
ideals gain expression in Africa. The observations of the case study will be combined with 
the conclusions drawn based on a final comparison of the six variables in question. It is 
this final comparison which will prove or disprove the hypotheses of this work. 
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Democratization, “the transition from authoritarianism to a stable democracy,”1 
has been hotly debated in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Democracy relies on voluntary 
compliance with the agreed set of rules in the political arena. This stable state of affairs is 
quite desirable but democratization, the process of getting to such a stable democracy can 
trigger undesirable side effects as the history of Africa’s democratic struggles reveals. 
When examining the potential of a society to successfully democratize many political 
scholars have asserted that certain characteristics must be present. Most notably, 
Seymour Lipset has identified the economic and structural qualities that states that have 
successfully democratized built upon. An illustration of these qualities will assist this 
work in determining democracy’s applicability. Largely drawing upon the experiences of 
European nations, Lipset argues that a nation that possesses a more stable and wealthy 
economy will find it easier to democratize. “From Aristotle down to the present, men 
have argued that only in a wealthy society in which relatively few citizens lived in real 
poverty could a situation exist in which the mass of the population could intelligently 
participate in politics and could develop the self-restraint necessary to avoid succumbing 
1 Marina Ottaway, “Democratization in Collapsed States” in Collapsed states: The 




to the appeals of irresponsible demagogues.”2 For Lipset large economic divisions in 
society lead to dictatorial regimes in which the richer class would rule over the poorer. As 
such the economic situation of the state in question would have to grow and develop to 
sustain democracy. This development or “modernization process may be viewed as 
historical phases, with democracy a part of the later developments, the ‘crowning 
institution’ of the participant society.”3 Wealth, industrialization, urbanization and 
education are identified as measurable indices which can track a nation’s development and 
Lipset concludes that economic development allows the poorer of the society to lessen 
their rigid commitment to one particular set of values and opens their political view to be 
able to ponder the different points of another group in society. As the society develops 
and its citizens grow accustomed to regarding politics with the calm necessary to allow 
for the peaceful transfer of power, democracy will emerge. 
In addition to the necessary economic requisites, Lipset also points out that the 
legitimacy and effectiveness of the political structures in a society must also be considered. 
For Lipset “legitimacy involves the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain 
the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for the 
society.”4 Similarly, an effective system is one that “satisfies the basic functions of 
2 Seymour Martin Lipsett, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and 
Political Legitimacy,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. LIH (March, 1959): 75. 
3 Ibid., 82. 
Ibid., 86. 
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government as defined by the expectations of most members of a society.”5 When state 
structures are able to heal the divisions within a society and are able to gain a measure of 
trust from a cross section of the populous, dissenting groups are less likely to question to 
right of the government to rule. A society views a government as effective and legitimate 
when the values espoused by the state match its own. When the state begins to reflect the 
value set of one particular group, others begin to challenge the government and crises 
develop. Groups on the outside of the governmental sphere will continue to question the 
legitimacy of the state and the state is forced to respond to the criticism thereby negatively 
impacting its effectiveness in other areas. A system which loses its effectiveness for 
extended periods of time eventually cause its citizens to question its legitimacy so the two 
must be maintained simultaneously. Lipset concludes: “economic development involving 
industrialization, urbanization, high educational standards, and a steady increase in the 
overall wealth of the society, is a basic condition sustaining democracy...But the stability 
of a given democratic system depends not only on the system’s efficiency in 
modernization, but also upon the effectiveness and legitimacy of the political system.”6 
Lipset’s views have been expounded upon here to explain the depth of Africa’s 
challenge to democratize. It is quite evident that in most African nations, many of the 
requisites for democracy do not exist. Julius Ihonvbere concedes that in Africa the 
dominant class is weak, the working class is uneducated and politically divided. Conflicts 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid., 85. 
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erupt and are not resolved by governmental institutions because they are considered 
neither effective nor legitimate. That Lipset’s requisites are not present is a primary 
reason for democratic efforts, not a deterrent. “It is precisely the desire to create the 
foundations for the attainment of these goals - stability, predictability, industrialization, 
and development - and to establish viable institutions for conflict mediation and resolution 
that Africans have historically fought for democracy. We can therefore understand why, 
in spite of the inexistence of preconditions that actually arise out of the European 
experience, Africans continue to struggle for democracy.”7 An inquiry into the rise of 
African authoritarianism will illustrate the resolve of African peoples to achieve 
democratic rule of law in their lands. 
The history of Africa’s democratization experiment did not begin at the demise of 
the Cold War, though it certainly gained momentum there. The independence struggle of 
African nations against their European colonial oppressors is a necessary starting point. 
European nations acquired African lands by conquest and maintained these colonies by 
repression. Dominance over the indigenous people was a high priority for colonial rulers 
and the colonial state was constructed to facilitate this control. Either by destroying 
traditional customs and rulers to create their own as was the French policy or the indirect 
control over existing rulers as was the English tendency, colonial constitutions, laws, and 
institutions were designed to hamper the indigenous thirst for freedom and self 
7Julius Ihonvbere, “Where Is The Third Wave?: A Critical Evaluation of Africa’s Non-Transition 
to Democracy,” Africa Today 43, no. 4 (1996): 347. 
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determination so the extraction of raw materials could be carried out in the most cost 
effective manner. 
The colonial economy was controlled by the ruling colonial elite to collect wealth 
at the service of the masses of people. This wealth would then flow from the colonial elite 
to the colonizing state so that state could develop. This colonial elite manned the colonial 
civil service which was always backed by the military force to police the compliance of 
rules and to maintain order pleasing to the colonial rulers. Should any expressions of 
public dissatisfaction arise, the colonial troops were called in to quiet the masses by the 
use of whatever force they deemed necessary. The colonial service and the colonial 
military were indelibly linked in the operation of the state. 
As African peoples challenged the colonial structure and it became clear that they 
would gain their independence, Europeans did not educate the newly emergent leaders in 
the concepts of governing an independent state. Decolonization became the 
rearrangement of hegemonic political structures as the organization of the civil service 
largely remained the same. At independence the agencies of the new governments were 
authoritarian in nature and this was the desired mode of rule because the inherited 
administrative apparatus was bureaucratically concerned with issues of domination. As 
such, when the leaders of the independence movements became the heads of state, they 
had the opportunity to make laws and build institutions that would enhance popular 
participation but they often adopted the same machinery used by the colonial powers. 
“Shortly after independence,... governmental systems in many African countries 
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degenerated into instruments for the enrichment of politically-dominant groups.”8 
Resource allocation, the distribution of goods and services, was presided over by a few 
individuals and their groups. Just as the case with colonialism, the masses of people were 
not introduced to the power sharing equation. These new leaders came to be new eûtes in 
their nations and concentrated national power squarely in their hands. 
These leaders justified their autocratic tendencies by saying their new states were 
weak from their births into independence and as such needed to secure itself from 
instabilities caused by external pressures and internal rivalries. “An open, competitive 
democracy, they claimed, would sharpen rather than diminish these cleavages.”9 The state 
began to practice control over trade and investment opportunities. The power to 
distribute government contracts, trade licenses, and public services such as education and 
health care was controlled by the state. Jobs were distributed to those seen as favorable 
and supportive to the state’s interests. Patronage systems became entrenched as the 
means by which eûtes secured their power bases and ahenated opposition. Control over 
the abiüty to aUocate resources, to issue Ûcenses and to hire people to staff bureaucratic 
positions led to widespread corruption. Where patronage did not ensure compüance, 
repression would. 
8 John Mukum Mbaku, “Post-Independence Opportunism and Democratization in Africa,” 
Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies 20, no. 4 (Winter 1995): 407. 
9 Carol Lancaster, Foreign Policy, no. 85 (1991/1992): 149. 
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“Nationalists of yesterday became ruthless dictators, life presidents, and little gods 
of today, and hopes for a better life receded into the distant future.”10 The authoritarian 
solution “perhaps more promising in the short run-in the long run is very likely to lead to a 
new cycle of discontent and collapse.”11 Politicians became corrupt and betrayed the 
interests of those whom they represented during the independence struggle. If the state 
saw an opposition group that it could not co-opt, imprisonment, forced exile, and 
executions were used to quell dissent. Jobs could be lost, property would be seized and 
leaders and their families would be harassed to protect national interests which came to 
mean the interests of the group in power. In many cases ruling elites were overthrown 
and new elites came into place but these new elites did not redistribute the wealth to the 
masses, only to themselves. Thus, the military coup d’etat became the prevailing mode of 
power transfer in many African nations. Coups and counter coups occurred with much 
frequency as it became the power struggle between competing elites that disregarded the 
needs and aspirations of the common people. Human rights degenerated to deplorable 
levels where populations were allowed to starve to death while powerful groups squabbled 
over territorial boundaries and transportation routes.12 The political instability of the post¬ 
independence era is matched by the economic situation of the time, exacerbated by 
10 Ihonvbere, 345. 
11 Ottaway, 235. 
12 Sidgi Kaballo, “Human Rights and Democratization in Africa,” Political Studies 43, (1995): 
190. 
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government neglect and theft. African leaders and their bureaucracies became known 
internationally for the wealth that they siphoned from their floundering economies. The 
populations would be hungry and in dire need of medical care while their leaders would be 
off squandering state funds in international markets. Opportunism became the rule of law 
as these elites redistributed the national wealth into their hands instead of using it to 
benefit the masses. 
These corrupt new leaders became increasingly distant from the people and the 
people began to show their dissatisfaction by revolting against the status quo. By the 
time the wall collapsed in Berlin and the cold war ended, the pro-democracy movement 
had gained momentum on two fronts, first by the resistance of opposition groups and 
secondly by pressure from international lenders. Rising up in response to the states’ 
inability or non-desire to develop infrastructure in rural areas and the lack of basic 
services and democratic rights in the urban areas, grassroots organizations of 
professionals, students, farmers and others began to experience a revival similar to that of 
the independence movement. Certain social groupings consolidated into interest groups 
and devised political demands and pressed the state for their demands to be met. Conflict 
ruled the day as popular groups agitated against the state by whatever means they could 
muster. It was often the case that students were the first to rise up and confront the state 
seeking to improve their own situations. “In Gabon in January 1990, students took strike 
action over teaching shortages and poor study facilities; in Cote d’Ivoire in February 1990, 
several inopportune electricity cuts before midterm exams sparked the first significant 
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protests.”13 These student protests soon gained wider support and was able to include 
broader segments of the population. Civil servants and professionals agitated regarding 
late or non payment and for higher living standards. Farmers stopped producing crops for 
state consumption and began smuggling them for subsistence. Open conflict in the streets 
of African capitals where opposition activists clashed with state police could be seen and 
the state was forced to conform from within. In the Congo for example in 1993, with the 
state infrastructure in disarray the opposition threatened to name a new prime minister and 
parliament of its own.14 
This popular pressure combined with the actions of international lending 
institutions. The world became unipolar as the Soviet bloc succumbed to economic and 
political pressures. With no rivalry between superpowers, Africa lost its geo-strategic 
importance and as a direct result, Africa’s strongmen lost the military and financial 
assistance they were receiving from both the Soviet Union and the United States. Without 
this support to quell dissent within their territories, many nations fell into disrepair. 
Somalia and Ethiopia reflect this trend as they descended into clanic rivalries. A prime 
example is that of the United States support of Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire. The U.S. 
saw Zaire as a strategic asset whose mineral wealth had to be saved from communist 
domination. 
13 Mbaku, 409. 
14 “Democracy in Africa: A Lull in the Wind,” The Economist 328 (September 4th, 1993): 43. 
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The lack of voluntary assistance from the superpowers coincided with a sharp 
increase in the external indebtedness African states experience. “In the midst of 
deteriorating economic and social conditions, African countries with high levels of debt, 
must continue to send scarce foreign exchange abroad to meet debt obligations.”15 The 
resources and goods which could be used to better the lives of their populations and build 
their economies go to service the debt incurred by the state. The level of this debt and 
lack of export earnings have compelled African nations to accept conditionality lending 
imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and donor nations. To qualify for 
these loans, the African borrower must agree to Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) 
which include devaluation of the local currency, deregulation of trade, reductions in 
bureaucratic and social spending and the privatization of industries. “As a result of these 
developments, the IMF and the World Bank have become increasingly involved in the 
movement to reform Africa’s political and economic institutions.”16 
Hand in hand with African nations not freely receiving monies as a result of global 
superpower conflict goes the embarrassment donor nations felt in supporting repressive 
regimes. Western nations needed to be able to justify their support of Africa’s strongmen 
and established the democratic precondition, in part, to keep their hands clean in the eyes 
15 Mbaku, 406. 
16 Ibid. 407. 
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of the world. Articulating this new approach, Douglas Hurd, Britain’s former foreign 
secretary: 
Countries which lend towards pluralism, public 
accountability, respect for the rule of law, human rights and 
market principles with repressive policies, corrupt 
management and wasteful, discredited economic systems 
should not expect us to support their folly with scarce aid 
resources which could be used better elsewhere.17 
Similarly former President Francois Mitterrand of France offered that his country would 
continue aid but that: 
This traditional aid will be more tepid for regimes that 
behave in an authoritarian manner, without accepting the 
evolution toward democracy, and more enthusiastic for 
those who take this step bravely and go as far as they can.18 
When democracy is imposed by pressure from foreign aid donors, the pro¬ 
democracy forces “tend to be particularly weak.”19 As a result multiparty elections forced 
to occur as a pre-condition to aid were held without a firm commitment to democracy by 
the incumbent leaders. The internal tensions building and the external donors pressing for 
socio-political change, African autocracies responded in a variety of ways. The national 
conference came to be used as a tool to liberalize the state. The first such conference 
17 “Democracy in Africa: Lighter Continent,” The Economist 322 (February 22nd, 1992): 20. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ottaway, 241. 
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occurred in Benin. President Mathieu Kerekou after nearly two decades of ruling Benin 
fron a Marxist-Leninist military standpoint found his treasury virtually empty as a result of 
economic mismanagement and political repression. Civil servants who had not been paid 
touched off strikes and “in 1990, the president convened a national conference of nearly 
500 prominent Beninese, in an attempt to create a national consensus on economic 
reforms.”20 Broadcast on live television and radio, instead of debating economics, the 
conference on February 25, 1990 “solemnly declared its autonomy and the executive 
power of its decisions.”21 Kerekou was stripped of his powers, a new constitution was 
written, an interim prime minister was selected and elections were set. “What had 
occurred was nothing less than democratization through a civilian coup d’etat.”22 These 
actions spawned conferences in Mali, Niger, Gabon and the Congo. Some conferences 
beget peaceful transfers as in Benin but in other cases disturbances played an active role in 
the process. In Mali the existing regime was overthrown and violence led to the fall of the 
regime before the transition process actually began.23 
Guy Martin defines four other transition process that are visible in Africa. 1. 
Government change via multiparty elections, evidenced by Senegal (February 1988), 
20 Lancaster, 153. 
21 Jacques Mariel Nzouankeu, “The Role of the National Conference in the Transition to 
Democracy in Africa: The Cases of Benin and Mali,” Issue: A Journal of Opinion XXI, no. 1-2 (1993): 
45. 
22 Lancaster, 153. 
23 Nzouankeu, 45. 
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Cape Verde and Sao Tome & Principe (March 1991) and Zambia (October 1991). 2. Co¬ 
opted Transitions. The head of state controlling the media, the electoral machinery and 
the financial resources defeat the opposition in elections under possible fraudulent 
circumstances. This has happened in Cote d’Ivoire in October 1990, in Cameroon in 
October 1992, in Ghana in November 1992 and in Kenya in December 1992. 3. Guided 
Democratization. A military regime maintains control over the transition process which is 
deliberately complex and prolonged. Burkina Faso, Guinea and Nigeria are examples of 
this. 4. Authoritarian reaction, sub-national conflict. Political restructuring has been 
hampered either by the refusal of the incumbent leader to open the political system (such 
as Malawi) or by sub-national conflict as in Algeria, Angola, Chad, Somalia and Liberia.24 
It is now clear that the question of democratization in the African context has its 
roots in the state structures that leaders inherited at independence and that it is this 
hegemony which caused the people to revolt against the state. It has also been shown that 
this internal pressure combined with foreign loan preconditions caused the autocratic 
leaders to at least begin the process of democratizing the state. This work now turns its 
attention to the concept of democracy itself and will identify three variables that are at the 
heart of western democracy. 




The concept of democracy has been debated and analyzed by all the peoples of the 
earth. As such, beyond the literal, there does not exist one clear and concise definition of 
democracy that all scholars may use to apply to their research. The literal translation of the 
word “entered English in the sixteenth century from the French démocratie; the word is 
Greek in origin, having been derived from demokratia, the root meanings of which are 
demos (people) and kratos (rule).”1 While there do exist common themes, it’s definition 
is relative to a people’s values and its application is highly subjective. Democracy is 
defined by specific people according to the era and the circumstances that those people 
find themselves in. We see that for Aristotle’s Constitution of Athens “all citizens, rich or 
poor fully participated in government.”2 This meant that women, slaves and foreigners 
were able to engage in the political process if they were citizens. However, “90 percent of 
the population were not citizens.”3 Similarly, Abraham Lincoln saw democracy as “a way 
1 David Held, “Democracy,” in The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World, ed. Joel Krieger 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 220. 
2 Compton's Interactive Encyclopedia, 2d ed., “Democracy” [CD-ROM] (Carlsbad: Compton’s 




of governing in which the whole body of citizens takes charge of its own affairs.”4 In 
contemporary times democracy refers to a form of government in which people have been 
able to show influence in the governmental decision making and the formation of public 
policy. It is a system of government in which the people - not one class, an autocrat, or a 
select group - share in directing the state’s activities.5 In order to evaluate a topic one 
must expose clear and precise standards that may be judged and examinations into 
western democracy have revealed that there are three such ideals that may be isolated. 
In 1831 Alexis de Tocqueville visited the United states from France to “examine in 
detail and as scientifically as possible, all the mechanisms of that vast American society 
which everyone talks of and no one knows.”6 Tocqueville felt that the “old aristocratic 
institutions of Europe would inevitably give way to democracy and social equality and he 
held up the American system as a successful model.”7 By studying the American system 
and the interaction between the values of the people, their social institutions and their 
political system, Tocqueville’s widely acclaimed analysis Democracy in America revealed 
that the aristocracy was being replaced by three principles that comprise the fundamentals 
of western democracy. 
In an aristocracy social position was determined by birth and a small hereditary 
elite controlled all political power, usurped all of society’s wealth and enjoyed all the 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Everett Carll Ladd, The American Polity: The people and Their Government, 3rd ed. (New 
York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1989), 3. 
7 Ladd, 3. 
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privileges that their status had to offer. Society was stratified from the aristocracy down 
and the majority of the population was left to squabble amongst themselves over the few 
goods and services that the elite allowed them. From this reality “a democracy more 
perfect than antiquity had dared to dream of started in full size and panoply from the midst 
of an ancient feudal society.”8 The principles rising in opposition to the aristocracy and 
thus composing the basis for western democracy are individualism, social equity and 
political democracy. 
Individualism 
As the aristocracy was being challenged it became central to attack the moral and 
intellectual basis on which it stood. Once that basis was eroded a new standard could 
enter and advance toward prominence. A brief discussion of classical liberal theory will 
illustrate the birth of individualism as a philosophy. The keystone of liberalism is the high 
value it places on the rights and freedoms of the individual.9 Liberalism considers 
individuals the “seat of moral value and each individual as of equal worth.”10 If all people 
are of equal worth then it follows that all people would be entitled to the same fruits of 
society but that was not the case in aristocratic life. Performance would be a key 
differential. There would be families who worked on the farm and there were families 
8 Ibid, 4. 
9 Ibid, 88. 
10 John A. Hall, “Liberalism,” in The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World, ed. Joel 
Krieger (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 538. 
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who owned the farm, each with different rights in society based on their function. The 
intellectual basis of individualism emerged from a view of humanity that attributed 
performance to environment. 
John Locke asserted that “the brain at birth is an empty cabinet”.11 Being void, the 
brain receives ideas, the object of thinking, from senses and reflection. Locke thusly 
reflects that “such are perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, 
willing, and all the different actings of our own minds, which we being conscious of, and 
observing in ourselves, do from these receive our understanding.”12 If all human 
perception were equal all people would be the same yet that is not the case. Locke 
elaborates: “External objects furnish the mind with the ideas of sensible qualities, which 
are all those different perceptions they produce in us and the mind furnishes the 
understanding with ideas of its own operations.”13 The phenomenon in our environment 
leave lasting impressions on our mind. These impressions become our thoughts and these 
thoughts become manifest in our actions. If all environments were the same then it 
follows that all thought and then all actions would be the same yet that is obviously not the 
case. 
It now being clear that people are equal at birth and that it is one’s perception of 
one’s environment that causes distinctiveness, Sir Isaac Newton completes the classical 
11 John Locke, "Essay Concerning Human Understanding, " World’s Greatest Classic Books 
[CD-ROM] (Ottawa: Corel Corporation, 1995). 
12 Ibid., 118. 
Ibid., 120. 13 
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liberal assertion that if you control the input (environment) you may control the output 
(thoughts and performance).14 Under such circumstances all people are unfettered in then- 
activities and freedom becomes a supporting concept for individualism. 
For Thomas Hobbes, man is free and his freedom necessitates activity which has 
no author but the will of that man himself. Hobbes makes it plain that “...from the use of 
the words free will, no liberty can be inferred of the will, desire or inclination, but of the 
man.”15 Free will and necessity go hand in hand for Hobbes: “as in the water that hath not 
only liberty, but a necessity of descending by the channel; so, likewise in the actions which 
men voluntarily do, which, because they proceed their will, proceed from liberty.”16 The 
tendency of man to act on his freedom (individualism) causes man to come into conflict 
with his counterparts. Both have active needs to express their freedoms and when there is 
discord that needs to be settled, there should be machinery in place that would ease 
matters. This machinery becomes Hobbes’ Leviathan: 
But as men, for the attaining of peace and conservation of 
themselves thereby, have made an artificial man, which we 
call a Commonwealth; so also they made artificial chains, 
called civil laws, which they themselves, by mutual 
covenants, have fastened at one end to the Ups of that man, 
or assembly, to whom they have given the sovereign power 
and at the other to their own ears. These bonds, in then- 
own nature but weak, may nevertheless be made to hold, by 
the danger, though not by the difficulty of breaking them.17 
14 Ibid., 58. 
15 Thomas Hobbes, “Leviathan”, World’s Greatest Classic Books [CD-ROM] (Ottawa: Corel 
Corporation, 1995). 
16 Ibid., 219. 
17 Ibid., 220. 
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The commonwealth or state, with its rules of conduct and its prohibitive laws is 
developed by man to guide themselves as they assert their individualistic tendencies. 
These laws are not meant to restrict a person’s development personally, just as that 
development infringes upon another individual. Such a state gains its legitimacy from the 
citizens. The people could break the laws but it is the people who put these laws into 
place. To go back on a covenant which one has conceded to with his fellow man exposes 
that man to the coercive means within the society. Thusly, outside of extreme cases, 
Hobbes’ Leviathan is a good working model for the state. 
Nineteenth century liberal Benjamin Constant sought to refine Hobbes’ thought as 
to the sovereignty of the people. Constant asserts that it is Hobbes’ belief that 
“democracy is absolute sovereignty in the hands of all.”18 Constant then takes issue with 
the usage of the word absolute. Constant moves that it is Hobbes’ conclusion that men’s 
agreements do not ensure their observance so a coercive force is necessary to make men 
respect them; therefore the sovereign has the absolute right of punishment. Constant then 
seeks to correct Hobbes by stating that “Democracy is power vested in the hands of all, 
but only the amount of power necessary for the safety of society.”19 The usage of 
‘absolute’ in the democratic equation could serve to stifle the very liberty it hopes to 
ensure. “Popular government is only a convulsive tyranny”20 for Constant and he 
18 Benjamin Constant, “Principles of Politics”, Department of History Brooklyn College ed., 
Source Book for History 2.1: History of Western Civilization II, 3rd ed. (New York: Brooklyn College 




advances that “when sovereignty is not limited, there is no means of protecting individuals 
from governments... the people is sovereign in one respect and subject in another: but in 
practice those two respects blend together. . .What matters to us is not that our rights can 
not be violated without the approval of that power (the state), but that such violation is 
prohibited to all powers.”21 The individual is safe from the state under such prohibition. 
Democracy becomes the vehicle by which individuals may assert themselves within reason 
and be safe from excessive intrusion into their lives. 
Constant then concludes our inquiry into the democratic ideal of individualism 
thusly: “Citizens possess individual rights independent of any social or political power, and 
any power which violates these rights becomes illegitimate. The rights of the citizens are 
individual liberty, religious liberty, liberty of thought, including its expression, the 
possession of property, the guarantee against any arbitrary action. No authority can 
impair these rights without tearing up its own title.”22 
Social Equity 
The question of social equity is an inevitable birth child of the notion of 
individualism. If all people are equal at birth and have a right to assert their individual 
wills within reason in a society, it follows that society must allow for this equal 
competition. The society itself must be constructed to ensure such equality and must ever 
be concerned with its maintenance. We may return to Tocqueville to see that “the gradual 
22 Ibid., 65. 
36 
development of the principle of equality is a providential fact. It has all the chief 
characteristics of such a fact. It is universal, it is lasting, it constantly eludes all human 
interference, and all events as well as all men contribute to its progress.”23 A democratic 
state concentrates on the equality of its citizens just as its citizens concentrate on their 
individualism. 
Democracy’s “ideal of equality has consistently asserted that each individual must 
be given an opportunity to strive and to achieve according to his or her efforts and 
ability.”24 When one speaks of equality within a democratic context it is specifically 
equality of opportunity which is meant. The opportunity to compete with other 
individuals in society when unrestricted is the definition of democratic social equity. Just 
as liberty is an essential component of individualistic thought, so it is with equality. 
Liberty and opportunity are married in the democratic equation and their ability to 
operate within a society are but one measure by which an outsider may judge how 
democratic a state is. 
Equality of opportunity is an ideal which must come to grip with reality. It is 
reality that shows us that equality of opportunity does not mean equality of result. In the 
democratic sense “if some individuals work harder or are more able, they should be 
permitted to enjoy their rewards.”25 If their abilities differ then their societal rewards will 
23 J. Roland Pennock, “Equality and Inequality,” in The Oxford Companion to Politics of the 
World, ed. Joel Kreiger (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 274. 
24 Ladd, 8. 
25 Ibid, 8. 
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differ and such inequality of result does not conflict with the democratic prerequisite of 
social equity. All that must be present for a nation to be democratic is for all citizens to be 
guaranteed the equality of opportunity. 
That results will differ is seen as a necessary outgrowth of equal democratic 
competition. “If the individual failed to achieve the goals which were attainable by the 
exercise of his individual faculties, the fault lay with himself. In the new society where all 
men were presumably equal and free, no longer could a defective social, political or 
economic structure, or even the will of and Divine Power, be blamed for individual 
mishap. If the new doctrine were true, failure became an individual responsibility.”26 
Within such a philosophical context, the notion of social equity does not mean that 
members of a polity will be equal in the purest sense. 
Social equity has proved most elusive in western states. Equality of opportunity 
for everyone is, even with the greatest effort, impossible to achieve fully, “and the United 
States at times has not made the effort at all.”27 No other example need be cited than that 
of the slave trade in the United States. America is the example of democracy that is held 
up to the world to emulate yet when it can be viewed that social equity has been 
systematically denied to black people in the United States for centuries, the ideal becomes 
that much more elusive. 
26 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, World’s Greatest Classic Books [CD-ROM] (Ottawa: Corel 
Corporation, 1995). 
27 Ladd, 9. 
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While certainly sufficient, there are less blatant examples than America’s treatment 
of black people that can be evaluated to judge its commitment to social equity. Edward 
Greensberg suggests two standards that may be used. “Our first concern is with the 
general distribution of goods, benefits, services and burdens in American society. . . Our 
second concern is with the distribution of decision-making power in American society.”28 
Social justice becomes a primary concern for Greensberg as viewed within his 
discussion of classical Liberalism. Greensberg defines liberalism as “the belief that the 
just society is one in which people have equal opportunity to practice civil and political 
freedoms, and to pursue their self-interest in the market place. Inequality, while not 
celebrated, is interpreted as a natural byproduct of a free society. Moreover, the effort to 
eliminate inequality is seen as potentially dangerous to the free society itself’.29 
Greensberg concludes that his study “will demonstrate that the United States is not a just 
society, by whatever standard one chooses to use” and that “such a failure is not merely 
accidental, but is inherent.. ,”30 
Now that we have it that social equity in a state means equality of opportunity, 
eventhough it does not necessitate that results will be equal, we can look to our third 
necessary component of democracy. 
28 Edward S. Greensberg, The American Political System: A radical Approach, 5th ed. 
(Glenview: Scott, Foreman and Company, 1989), 15. 
29 Ibid., 21. 
30 Ibid., 22. 
39 
Political Democracy 
Once we allow that individualism gave birth to the notion of social equity, then we 
see that political democracy is its twin. It has been shown that individuals are equal in 
aptitude and that equality of opportunity is a prerequisite for a democratic state. John 
Russell advances that without popular control of the state in the hands of the people, the 
democratic equation is incomplete. “The only efficient remedy against oppression is for 
the people to retain a share of that supreme power in their own possession.”31 It is a 
necessary extension of individualism and social equity for man to want to have a voice in 
the organization of the state and to have influence in the formation of the laws that will 
restrain his natural liberty. 
As we have seen earlier, social and political thought had previously leaned toward 
the aristocratic notion of governance. Under this line of thinking, governance was 
considered to be a difficult task requiring great intelligence, training and character and was 
not to be left in the hands of the fickle ordinary people. The democratic ideal of political 
power resting in the hands of the people was a most radical departure from that line of 
thought. “The foundation of democracy is faith in the capacities of human nature; faith in 
human intelligence and in the power of pooled and cooperative experience.”32 
31 Lord John Russell, “Essay On Government”, Department of History Brooklyn College ed., 
Source Book for History 2.1: History of Western Civilization II 3rd ed. (New York: Brooklyn College 
Press, 1963), 74. 
32 Greensberg, 24. 
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“In the manner of exercising this power and satisfying this desire of the people. . . free 
states have differed.”33 There are as many models of ensuring popular representation 
as there are states. These models have differed over time and have developed subjective 
institutions with different uses for each people. Let us examine three forms of democracy 
to illustrate its subjective nature. 
Direct Democracy 
In its simplest definition, democracy is a form of governance in which the people 
exercise direct control over the decisions made in the state. One of the earliest forms of 
democracy34, was a “political society in which direct face-to-face participation by ordinary 
people in their own governance is practiced.”35 This direct democracy found a home 
among the Greeks and came to mean that all citizens were able to gather and publicly 
affect the direction of the state. For the Greeks, the term citizen came to mean 
“continuous involvement in the public life of the community.”36 
To be unconnected to this decision making process was to be a disenfranchised 
non-citizen with no say in community affairs. For the Greeks, a person was human only to 
the extent that they were involved in the life of the community and to the extent that they 
33 Russell, 74. 
34 This statement is made taking into consideration the notes in Appendix A on the origins of 
democracy. 
35 Greensberg, 22. 
36 Ibid., 22. 
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were active in the public arenas. It was believed that in such a public space through the 
debate, the distance between the ruler and the ruled would be destroyed making for a 
situation of political equity.37 
As state machinery became more complex and populations grew to encompass 
millions of people, such direct participation became unworkable and new models had to be 
developed. 
Representative Democracy 
In contrast to direct democracy where there was no difference between the ruler 
and the ruled in the public space, representative democracy held the government and the 
governed as distinctly separate. “Politics becomes a process not of deliberation but of 
forging instruments by which citizens may exercise some control over and protection 
against government leaders.”38 In this construct, the people elect representatives who 
through such election are authorized to make decisions on the behalf of their constituents. 
While remaining crucial, the people now rule indirectly and their participation is limited to 
the periodic elections of those who will act in their interest. 
While representative democracy is an improvement on the model of direct 
democracy Greensberg cites two difficulties that it is prone to. First, “participation in such 
a system is only intermittent, involving the election of representatives and the occasional 
37 Ibid., 23. 
38 Ibid., 25. 
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conveyance of demands ... to those representatives.”39 Such limited political involvement 
could erode public knowledge of the issues of the day and such ignorance could lead to 
public apathy or discontent. The second concern is that “representative democratic 
systems have a strong tendency to create a professional political class-a group of people 
who make life as a representative a full-time occupation.”40 This new class could grow in 
autonomy and move on policy issues in directions which are inconsistent with the people 
who elected them. 
Pluralist Democracy 
As a modification upon the representative model, plural democracy emerged to 
further define influence on governmental activity by the populous. A pluralist democracy 
is one in which government is open and porous as it is composed of competing groups and 
institutions. This view allows for the citizenry to vote for representatives but it also 
allows for people to belong to interest groups. These interest groups then lobby the 
government to affect policy in their favor. 
According to Greensberg, pluralism asserts that 1) “most Americans are 
uninformed about politics and are neither overly interested nor particularly sophisticated 
about political events.”41 Theorists of direct democracy move that a democratic citizen 
was rational, informed and interested in political life. Pluralists, say this is not the case in 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid., 26. 
41 Ibid., 27. 
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modem states. 2)Pluralists argue that “while the distance between pluralism and the 
classical, participatory conception is enormous, the American system works, and often 
with distinction.”42 Power is transferred peacefully among ruling groups and the voices 
of people in groups are heard and considered by the state. 
These three examples of political democracy are given to illustrate that there are 
many ways for a society to express democracy in participation. In each model there is 
specific allowance for participation of the people in governmental decision making. Now 
that individualism, social equity and political democracy have been isolated in the western 
political context, let us turn to the African set and find three variables that may be used for 
comparison. 
42 Ibid., 28. 
CHAPTER 4 
THE AFRICAN POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 
This chapter will utilize group theory and the concept of access to state resources 
as a component of such. It is within this theoretical approach that this chapter isolates the 
permanace of social groups, the leadership styles of African heads of state, and the 
politicized military as three variables which aid our inquiry. 
Social Groupings 
Just as the ideal of individualism is necessarily basic to an understanding of western 
democracy, the constancy of African social groupings must be explored to comprehend 
African politics. The basis of socio-political activity in Africa is the group. This emphasis 
has its origins in the beginnings of humanity itself as that first African society found it 
wisest to gather into groups to hunt and collect so they could survive. It is this causal 
relationship, the need to come together to insure survival and indeed to enjoy life that is 
the nucleus of the African political macro-atom. 
Human history can be labeled a chronicle of man’s fight for survival against both 
nature and other humans. “At the level of social groups, therefore, development implies 
an increasing capacity to regulate both internal and external relationships.”1 Groups have 
historically come together to pool resources, collect power and use this power to ensure 
1 Rodney, 3. 
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the stability of the group from other forces both internal and external, both natural and 
man-made. 
“The group-based concepts of African social structures have their roots in 
traditional forms of social organization.”2 People become members of a group because 
they are bom into it or because joining a certain organization or community can assist the 
person in coping with his/her particular set of circumstances. The individual works 
throughout his life for the group gathering resources. The group operates to consolidate 
those resources into goods and services and subsequently the group dispenses these to its 
members. The extent to which the group is able to function in this manner is the 
proportion of its strength. In ancient times, a family who had the most members (children, 
cousins, aunts, uncles, etc.) had the greatest ability to gather resources and consequently 
the greatest strength. In contemporary Africa, the groups with the greatest membership 
and with the most resources are the groups with the most political power to influence 
governmental institutions. 
Cheikh Anta Diop’s Law of Distances says that “two groups that are not fighting 
over the same living space or the same market and that instead of cohabiting in the same 
territory occupy different territories separated by space can enter into normal relations.”3 
Unfortunately this is rarely the case in African states. Scarcity of resources in a given 
territory will cause neighboring groups to have conflict and thus test the strength of 
2 Naomi Chazan and others, eds., Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa, 2d ed. (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), 75. 
3 Cheikh Anta Diop, Civilization or Barbarism: An Authentic Anthropology, trans.Yaa-Lengi 
Meema Ngemi (New York: Lawrence Hill Books, 1991), 124. 
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competing groups. It is this group conflict, be it elite vs. mass, class vs. class, intra-ethnic 
or ethnic group vs. ethnic group, which is at the center of African political activity. 
During the colonial period, the natural tendency of Africans to organize into 
groups deepened. “Colonial administrations in most parts of the continent viewed 
coherent groups as desirable precisely because they facilitated control.”4 Often traditional 
political units were incorporated into the colonial apparatus with their identities intact so 
that colonial administrators could watch their activities closely and influence them in ways 
that kept them non-threatening. 
Colonization visited a plethora of hardships upon African communities as seen in a 
previous section of this work. “Group life allowed Africans to control fragments of daily 
existence. It constituted a significant channel for individual mobility and a psychological 
cushion against the dislocations of a changing environment.”5 As the burdens of life 
under colonization increased so did the number and diversity of social groupings. These 
groupings provided insulation from states who proved to be unsympathetic to the needs of 
their populations and were often able to translate the needs of the people from an 
economic level to the desires of the people in the political realm. As African people began 
to express their anticolonial sentiments, social groupings proved to be elemental to the 
process. “Almost every nationalist leader started his political career in a voluntary or 
economic organization. Flex Houphouet Boigny in the Syndicat Agricole African, 
4 Chazan, Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa, 75. 
5 Ibid. 
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Nnamdi Azikiwe in the Ibo state Union, and Julius Nyerere in the Tanganyika Teachers’ 
Association are just some examples.”6 
Africa’s acute reliance upon the group as the main political unit is the primary 
element of Africa’s political environment for this work As Africa’s style of political 
leadership is examined and the politicized military is investigated it is the view of this work 
that both are functions of group activity and conflict; heads of state as they favor certain 
groups over the other and the military as it acts as a group unto itself. 
Leadership Styles 
The emphasis of the African state on political personalities is an outgrowth of the 
independence era. The leader of the independence movement, soon after political victory 
declares himself president within the new political structure of the state, giving birth to 
the prevalence of presidentialism. For Harry Goulboume “presidentialism involves the 
centralization of state power in the hands of the president and /or his office.”7 As such, 
the head of state becomes the nucleus of political authority. The final decisions 
concerning national issues come from the head of state often without consultation from 
legislatures or judiciaries. With constitutions either not present or designed to serve the 
needs of the political center “these men initially gained salience as the embodiment of the 
nascent political center and subsequently as the personification of its modes of 
6 Ibid. 
7 Harry Goulboume, “The State, Development and the Need for Participatory Democracy in 
Africa” in, Popular Struggles for Democracy in Africa, ed. Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o (London: The United 
Nations University, 1987), 31. 
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operation.”8 The new leaders fashioned the state to reflect their control over the newly 
acquired resources and as such laid the foundation for the forms of patrimonialism that are 
present today.9 
Goulboume explains that instead of using their newly acquired and considerable 
power to cement popular participation and develop democratic institutions “the first 
generation of post-independence leaders threw their weight behind the construction of a 
variety of repressive systems and used their authority to justify these new forms of 
repression.”10 This was justified by two arguments 1) as they were new states engaged in 
the process of nation building, the unity that the nationalist struggle bore should be 
maintained at all costs and 2) the institutions and beliefs that compose democracy were 
colonial in character, came from the former imperialist countries and are therefore by 
association unacceptable.11 
There arose two styles of leadership within the presidentialist construct after the 
independence era. The first is the charismatic kind and the second is the patriarchal 
type.12 Both styles of leaders are those who were schooled in the colonial education 
system and who were central to successful anticolonial movements. However, they differ 
in the nature of their group relations prior to the independence movement and their status 
8 Chazan, Politics and Society In Contemporary Africa, 162. 
9 Ibid., 162. 
10 Goulboume, 35. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Chazan, Politics and Society In Contemporary Africa, 162. 
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within such groups. Many of the charismatic style leaders did not occupy important 
positions within their social groupings. These leaders adopted messages which drew the 
support of the masses and were able to transfer that support into successful movements. 
Their backing from social institutions was fragile and it has consequently fostered 
autocratic leadership tendencies. Patriarchal leaders differed in that they tended to emerge 
from preexisting civilian and military groups. They enjoyed their support during the 
anticolonial movements and that support was frequently continued after independence. 
Patriarchal leaders proceeded to maneuver their states with a “mixture of clientelism 
between the head of state and powerful patrons...”13 
Both the charismatic and the patriarchal styles of leadership engendered autocratic 
states given toward the patrimonial distribution of resources. Charismatic leaders are 
typified by Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Sekou Toure, Kenneth Kaunda and Robert 
Mugabe.14 Heads of state of this type envisioned themselves as the personification of the 
state and as such all power rested in their hands alone. Cliques of people wedded to the 
ideology of the head of state was created and to quiet dissent, all rivals were 
systematically imprisoned or exiled. 
13 Ibid., 164. 
14 Ibid,, 162. 
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“In this mode of operational decision making was politicized.”15 Inclusion in the 
single party which held state power became the most important way to receive goods and 
resources from the state. “Because charisma acted as a substitute for institutionalization, 
it was also susceptible to abuse.”16 To not be included in the ruling party was to be 
secondary and tertiary to receive state services. This style of leadership thus engendered 
many other problems such as crisis of succession and conspiracies, purges and reshuffling 
of power within the party. 
Among the patriarchal leaders are included Jomo Kenyatta, Leopold Senghor, and 
Felix Houphouet-Boigny.17 Autocratic states were bom under patriarchal leaders as they 
tended to manipulate political actors. These men purposefully designed for themselves 
images as the father of their states. “Kenyatta liked to be called Mzee(the elder), 
Houphouet forwarded the image of a wise man and a chief and Ahidjo held himself 
purposefully aloof and reserved.”18 
Patriarchal leaders saw themselves as above daily politics and sought to co-opt 
opposition groups to make them more dependent on his power. Rival groups were pitted 
against each other where such conflict serves the interests of the head of state. 
Bureaucratic eûtes were created where decisions were made through handfuls of trusted 
advisors. It became important to learn how to manipulate personal relations and the 
15 Ibid., 163. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
Ibid., 164. 18 
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amount of administrative skill one exhibited was frequently the measure of that persons 
political power. Thus favoritism and nepotism was rewarded and this served to fuel 
factionalism and corruption.19 Be they charismatic or patriarchal, no African leader has 
proven to be invincible when confronted with a desirous military apparatus. This work 
now turns to the military as a group and will examine the means by which this group 
accesses state resources and power. 
Politicized Military 
A striking example of Africa’s colonial legacy continuing to shape the nature of 
African politics is the activity of the military. The colonial state was built around a strong 
military apparatus as imperialist nations used coercion to move indigenous populations to 
work for them. This coercive apparatus was the main element used to control the 
exploited peoples as it would be mobilized to secure new territories, crush uprisings and 
maintain order in the colony. As the different expressions of state power were transferred 
during independence, this emphasis on a strong military was bequeathed to the new heads 
of state. The authoritarian regimes that emerged after independence had as their necessary 
outgrowth military repression. The imbalance created when the masses of a state are 
disenfranchised will give birth to public dissatisfaction and discontent. These ill feelings 
toward the status quo have caused African leaders to build upon their coersive apparatus. 
The cost, both economically and politically of increased spending on the military has had a 
staggering impact on African politics. The poorest states often have the greatest amount 
19 Ibid. 
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of public insurrections because of that poverty and it is these nations that will spend more 
on their military to deal with these insurrections, thus taking away money that could be 
used for social services which increases the level of poverty in that country which 
increases the justification the people have to revolt. This “Catch-22” situation has 
contributed to the problems facing African politics for decades. 
Peter Anyang’ Nyongo elaborates: “Lenin argued that the revolutionary forces 
cannot just lay hold on the state machinery and use it for their own ends; the first task is to 
smash the inherited state machinery, beginning with its apparatuses of repression, and then 
to create a new state commensurate with the demands of the revolution.”20 As new states 
emerge with their Afro-Marxist and socialist tendencies, this element of socialist theory 
was somehow overlooked. Instead of dismantling the coercive apparatus and reshaping it 
to suit African needs, the colonial ideology was accepted that a strong military was 
necessary to maintain control over the people. 
As such the coup d’etat is an all too common method of political power transfer. 
Since independence African militaries have often not waited for elections (that probably 
were not coming) to shift power into different hands. The first coup occurred in Togo on 
January 13, 1963. By 1975 almost half (20 out of 41) of Africa’s states were ruled by 
military groups and by 1985, Africa had suffered its 61st coup d’etat. “On statistical 
grounds alone coups and military rule had become the most prevalent political phenomena 
in Africa.”21 
20 Nyong’o, 23. 
21 Samuel Decalo, Coups and Army Rule in Africa (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 2. 
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Not only are the prospects for democracy dim in such an atmosphere, even an 
autocratic regime is not secure. Africa’s most divided and vulnerable states were the first 
victims but even those seen as the continent’s strongest fell victim. Ghana possessed a 
strong economy, high literacy rates and per capita incomes with less intense ethnic 
cleavages. Nigeria was seen as the most politically sophisticated state in West Africa and 
had been a pacesetter for the continent. Both fell in 1966, proving that there was no safe 
haven in Africa from military control. 
Military leaders and western analysts have sought to explain such interference by 
saying that socio-political weakness in a state draws the military into the political arena. 
These analysts say that the military is endowed with professionalism, cohesion and an 
efficiency which compels it to move into the political arena to save the state from 
inefficient and corrupt civilians. Samuel Decalo asserts that these attempts to explain this 
phenomena “as a result of systemic deficiencies grossly lacks in explanatory value.”22 
The African military does not conform to such an analysis and a case in point for 
Decalo is where ethnic cohesion is concerned. Where in western nations the military is 
often reflected by “neat hierarchical command-flow charts. . . in some states the ethnic 
split between the officer corps and the rank and file is absolute.”23 In Sudan every officer 
is northern, Muslim and Arab, in Chad before 1975 only two officers came from the 
northern two-thirds of the country and 60 percent of the population, and in Benin over 80 
22 Ibid., 3. 
23 Ibid., 5. 
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percent of the Army rank and file is of northern ethnicity, while the officer corps is 80 
percent southern.24 
African armies are composed of armed camps distinct in nature and who are loyal 
to their officers. These officers compete amongst themselves and as such the military 
reflects the divisions in larger society. When the military assumes control over the state, 
its own divisions and competitions consume its energy from governing the state as they 
spend much of their resources securing its power from challenges. 
“Coups are at inception conspiracies”25 and for secrecy reasons they involve only 
select segments of the officer corps. These officers assume control in the name of the 
whole military and state as their goal to transform the nature of the state. “Inevitably 
every coup will be perceived as the rise to preeminence of one loyalty pyramid and its 
subsequent monopolization of the fruits of office, and the relative decline of other 
factions.”26 As such these coups do nothing but exaggerate the state’s problems. 
Military leaders offer that they intervene to save the state from abusive civilian 
authority. Clearly there are instances where this was truly the goal. Jerry Rawlings and 
Thomas Sunkara did enjoy, to differing degrees, popular support and did attempt to carry 
out their stated reform goals. However, the opposite is more often the case. While the 
1965 coup in the Central African Republic occurred within the context of public 
corruption and economic crisis, “the most important cause of the coup was the personal 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid., 6. 
26 Ibid. 
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ambitions of Colonel Jean-Bedel Bokassa, the chief of staff, who had manifested his 
inclinations on numerous previous occasions.”27 Similarly in Uganda, General Idi Amin 
enumerated an eighteen-point justification of problems with the government of Milton 
Obote. Decalo strongly disagrees stating that “the coup was anything but a simple 
personalist power grab by an individual who without his uniform and the power it 
conferred was literally nothing and nobody.”28 Whatever the justifications and underlying 
reasoning, we may observe that the coup d’etat is a practice continuing today. The 
Congo, Sierra Leone and the former Zaire are but three examples in 1997 alone that show 
that Africa will have to struggle to obtain political democracy for many years to come. 
This work has established individualism, social equity and political democracy as 
three variables that compose western democracy and has isolated the social group, the 
leadership style and the politicized militry as three variables which contribute to Africa’s 
political situation. Now, this work turns its attention to the nation of Ghana as a material 
example which will show which set of variables has gained prominance in that country. 
27 Ibid., 9. 
28 Ibid., 10. 
CHAPTER 5 
CASE STUDY - GHANA 
Historical Review 
The coastal area of western Africa was the primary source of gold which provided 
a measure of strength to the West African empires of the time. The wealth displayed by 
these prosperous people attracted the European powers who established forts on the Gulf 
of Guinea coast for trading in gold and African slaves. The Portuguese were followed by 
“the Dutch, the French, the Swedes, the Danes, the British and the Brandenburgers 
(Germans), all engaged in keen and acrimonious competition for the West Coast trade 
mainly in slaves, gold and spices.”1 The British emerged out of the resulting European 
conflict dominant in that sector and after having engaged the Danish, the Dutch and the 
Ashanti Union of Akan states in wars and treaties assumed control of the land and its 
people. “In 1844 the British obtained a protectorate over the country surrounding the 
Cape Coast.”2 
The Berlin Conference of 1884-85 brought further European competition for all of 
Africa and to secure their conquered property Britain established protectorates over the 
Ashanti and Northern Territories in 1901. The Gold Coast was introduced to the world 
1 Joseph R. A. Ayee, An Anatomy of Public Policy Implementation: The Case of Decentralization 




capitalist system as a supplier of gold, raw cocoa and forest resources and the African 
population was subject to the slavery like conditions of colonial rule. From the turn of the 
century to the end of World War II the indigenous people were forced to adopt to the 
institutional machinations of colonial rule. The British imperial system emphasized 
indirect governmental control through the manipulation of local administrative units. 
“Britain found the institution of chieftancy organized to carry out the task of indirect 
rule.”3 It thus became elemental to colonial life to have a high degree of separation 
between ruling eûtes, who gained their prominence through their connection to the state 
apparatus and the masses who were exploited for their labor. The foreign settlers would 
appoint indigenous eûtes who in turn would maneuver the populous into subservient 
positions through trickery and coercion. The anti-colonial struggle challenged both the 
legitimacy of colonial rule and objected to British manipulation of indigenous customs. 
Kwame Nkrumah led the movement for independence and the British were forced 
to allow a national constitution which stipulated elections in 1951 of a ministerial 
government. Nkrumah's Convention People's Party (CPP) won the majority of the seats 
and as Prime Minister, Nkrumah led the transitional government through elections in 1954 
and 1956. On March 6, 1957 the Gold Coast Colony merged with British Togoland to 
become the independent Repubûc of Ghana. As head of state, Nkrumah used his position 
to fortify state apparatus from opposition. Being elected president in 1960, Nkrumah was 
declared president-for-life in 1962 and ruled Ghana as a one-party state embracing the 
tenets of African socialism. 
3 Ibid., 14. 
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During this time Ghana was a source of inspiration for Africa's anti-colonial 
struggles and provided shelter and advice for those fighting against European imperialism 
Nkrumah advocated a pan-African ideology that would unify the newly independent 
nations under a central banner. The visionary ideals expressed internationally were not 
matched by an enlightened eco-political policy at home. Nkrumah fortified his CPP by 
expanding state institutions so their sphere of influence would be stronger. This expansion 
proved costly both economically and politically. Mismanagement and structural 
inefficiencies became apparent as state employees began to enjoy the fruits of office and 
did not justly distribute them throughout society. "Key ethnic and professional groups 
voiced their discontent through the rejection of Nkrumah's brand of African socialism and, 
increasingly, through non-cooperation with government authorities."4 Such social 
discontent caused the state to adopt increasingly coercive methods of maintaining order 
and this conflict led to the coup which ousted Nkrumah in February of 1966. 
The National Liberation Council (NLC) now in control of the state was composed 
of professional and rural Akan elites in stark contrast to the minority ethnic groups and 
urban residents who made up the CPP. The NLC returned the state to civilian control in 
October 1969 under K. A. Busia and his Progress Party. Busia's stated commitment to 
democracy was negated by political control being orchestrated by one ethnic faction of 
Ghanaian society which was "incapable of either significantly ameliorating economic 
4 Naomi Chazan, “Liberalization, Governance, and Political Space in Ghana,” in Governance 
and Politics in Africa, ed. Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), 
125. 
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conditions or reducing growing regional and social disparities."5 The military led by I.K. 
Acheampong intruded again on January 13, 1972. His rule was "associated with the 
systematic abuse of the state for personal gain, the further deterioration of the economy, 
external neglect, the alienation of large portions of the population, the relinquishment by 
the state of responsibility for social welfare and increasing state fragility."6 Acheampong 
and his Supreme Military Council (SMC) was in turn ousted by Fred Akuffo and the SMC 
II in 1978. Akuffo acknowledged popular demand to return the state to civilian control 
but he was ousted by Flight. Lt. Jerry Rawlings on June 4, 1979, weeks before scheduled 
elections. Rawlings and his Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) was composed 
of a radical group of young soldiers. Upon gaining power the AFRC engaged violent 
punitive measures against those they saw as corrupt in both the military and bureaucracy. 
The AFRC then planned to form "a movement which would act as a political watchdog 
and protect the gains of the June Fourth Revolution."7 Dr. Hilal Limann was elected 
chairing a northern coalition whose government was hindered by a weakened economy, 
malfunctioning state institutions and public suspicion. Limann's administration 
exaggerated the gap between the state and society by reviving the patronage system. This 
again allowed state functionaries the power to pick and choose who would benefit from 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Emmanuel Hansen, “The State and Popular Struggles in Ghana, 1982-86,” in, Popular 
Struggles for Democracy in Africa, ed. Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o (London: The United Nations University, 
1987), 186. Cuba proved to be inspirational as a group of the AFRC had visited Cuba for the World 
Festival of Youth in the summer of 1978. 
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state services and the resulting competition between bureaucratic leadership caused the 
divide between societal groups and state institutions to widen. Rawlings had been 
observing Limann's politics closely and decided that it was time to intervene again. 
On December 31, 1981 Rawlings again seized control of the state under the 
auspices of the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC). Ghanaian politics under 
Rawlings control can be said to have four distinct phases. Phase one dates from Rawlings' 
second incursion until 1983. 
Phase I 
When the PNDC came to power it held as its stated goals "moral reform through 
the eradication of the oppressive institutions and practices associated with elite privilege 
and popular exclusion from public affairs. People's power in the eyes of the ideologues of 
the first phase of the Rawlings era, translated into mass involvement into overseeing the 
affairs of the economy and the society."8 Rawlings' second coming was seen as a 
repudiation of all the past regimes and a challenge of the distribution of power in the 
country since its independence. “It was to give effective political representation to the 
average man and woman whose interests were frequently misrepresented or 
unrepresented, even abused by corrupt soldiers and multi-party politicians.”9 This coup 
was an act of rebellion by the youth against the senior elements in the military as well as in 
8 Chazan, Liberalization, Governance, and Political Space in Ghana, 127. 
9 Maxwell Owusu, “Tradition and Transformation: Democracy and the Politics of Popular Power 
in Ghana,” The Journal of Modern African Studies, No. 34, 2 ( 1996): 308. 
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society. Rawlings was supported by discontented urban masses, the urban unemployed, 
lower level trade unionists, students, and a group of radical left wing intellectuals. “The 
declared enemies of the revolution, included the entrepreneurs, the successful large 
farmers, the professional men and the business community.”10 As such the PNDC was not 
beholden to any of the previously powerful elements and this independence emboldened 
challenges to all sectors of society. Politics became the topic of debate state wide and all 
of societies elements were subjected to intense scrutiny. Mass rallies and demonstrations 
protested throughout Ghanaian streets and public discussion groups sprang up to debate 
Ghana's future. The PNDC relied on support from the masses of people who were 
disenfranchised by the previous regime and as such did not have to soften its stance to 
placate pressure groups. To enhance popular participation the PNDC created Peoples 
Defense Committees (PDC) and Workers Defense Committees (WDC) to actively engage 
the masses in various aspects of state activity. These defense committees were to be the 
foundation of popular power but they often fell short of their created intent “undermined 
by their rash and cynical campaign of unprovoked attacks against so-called ‘enemies of the 
revolution’. The beatings, fines, extortions and detentions of so many innocent citizens, 
including elders, threatened the acceptance of the revolution by the general public which 
considered PDC/WDC atrocities as un-Ghanaian and clearly undemocratic.”11 These 
10 Jonathan R Frimpong-Ansah, The Vampire State in Africa: The Political Economy of Decline 
in Ghana (Trenton: Africa World Press, Inc.: 1992), 112. 
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activities “aroused the indignation and anger of well-meaning Ghanaians who could not 
stand their personal vendetta and brutalities and abuse of power.”12 
Rawlings stressed governmental accountability and state reciprocity while he 
rejected "liberal models of democratic government as neocolonialist and unsuitable to 
Ghanaian conditions."13 Unfortunately the PNDC did not produce clear guidelines by 
which this was to be accomplished. Conflict grew out of this uncertainty and the leftist 
PNDC fell into odds with itself and the right. The right wing of Ghanaian politics was 
composed of the comprador bourgeoisie, the top hierarchy of the military, top bureaucrats 
and professionals and they attacked the defense committees as incapable of guiding the 
state. The right conceded to the need for reform but it labeled the defense committees as 
"vigilante groups who were only anxious to appropriate and share what others had worked 
hard to accumulate."14 The right wing charged that "public policy was idiosyncratic, 
chaotic, spasmodic and without any consistent plan" and that "government was associated 
with people who were far too young, inexperienced, untried and of low educational 
quality."15 The right used professional organizations to struggle against state policies. 
The Bar Association, the Association of Recognized Professional Bodies, established 
churches and their newspapers were enlisted to question the governments goals and 
propagate their ideological leanings. 
12 Ayee, 107. 
13 Ibid., 127. 
14 Hansen, 195 
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In addition to having to cope with right wing pressures the PNDC also struggled 
within on the economic direction of the state. This economic debate first focused on the 
issue of devaluation. The PNDC had engaged the IMF and the World bank in discussions 
geared at obtaining a fiscal plan for the economy. The June Fourth Movement (JFM) and 
the New Democratic Movement (NDM) were suspicious that the talks were held in such 
secrecy and that a deal might be cut behind the others back They were not convinced that 
devaluation would cure their economic ills and wanted a structural plan that would erase 
the problems of underdevelopment. The JFM and the NDM held talks and fashioned a 
report that would "fit the devaluation into a developmental framework which 
recommended autonomous and self-reliant development based on mass mobilization."16 
When their report was passed over and the Economic Rehabilitation Plan (ERP) was 
instead adopted these groups felt bitterly betrayed. 
Out of this anger there was a confrontation between the left and the state on 
October 28. The following day Rawlings held heated talks with officers loyal to Sergeant 
Aloga Akata-Pore who voiced their disdain for security chief Kojo Tsikata. Rumors 
circulated after this meeting that Rawlings and Tsikata had fled the country and that Chris 
Atim and Akata-Pore had taken control of the country. Rawlings saw the rumor as an 
attempt by the left and the JFM to undermine his authority. On November 23 there was a 
coup attempt and the government arrested right wing members as responsible. Rawlings 
saw this attempt as linked to the rumor and used this opportunity to detain many of the 
16 Ibid., 198. 
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JFM members. Akata-Pore and his troops were arrested and Atim fled the country.17 
The JFM was left in disarray, other leftist groups scattered and by December of 1983 
Rawlings had effectively derailed his opposition. The NDM came out in support of the 
ERP and in so doing gained temporary favor from the state. Hence, Phase I saw a 
consolidation of state control by Rawlings. Having secured its authority, the PNDC 
turned its full attention to Ghana’s economic condition. 
Phase II 
The second phase of the PNDC rule was punctuated by Nigeria's January 1983 
expulsion of over one million Ghanaians. The addition of these people and the drought 
plaguing the country increased the pressure on the PNDC to strengthen its public 
institutions, revive the failing economy and work disenfranchised social groups back into 
its institutional framework. "The essence of the PNDC's decisions in 1983 (which paved 
the way for the second phase of its rule) was to separate economic from political concerns 
and to concentrate first on the amelioration of economic conditions." 18 As such the 
PNDC abolished the defense committees. Rawlings moved to secure his administration 
from opposition and in so doing he cut avenues of popular access to state administrators. 
This move allowed the PNDC to move economic forces without hearing the wounded 
voices of the affected people. Ghana's economic state was to be restored at all costs. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Chazan, Liberalization, Governance and Political Space in Ghana, 130. 
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The ERP was seen as the vehicle which would cure the economy and its adoption 
meant that the PNDC accepted the political and economic conditionalities that the World 
Bank and the IMF would impose. Devaluation of the currency, the removal of subsidies, 
increased prices to producers and streamlining of the budget and the civil service was 
among the stringent economic measures imposed on the economy. The PNDC was also 
pressed by these foreign donor agencies to liberalize its political practices. The National 
Commission for Democracy (NCD) was "established and charged with the task of 
designing a "true" (as distinct from "new") democracy, based on Ghanaian "tradition, 
history and culture". With the creation of the NCD the political agenda shifted from 
action to thought."19 The NCD became a think tank whose duty it was to theorize upon a 
new democratic framework yet a deadline for proposals was never firmly set and as such 
Ghanaian political life did not undergo any liberalization. 
Instead, Rawlings in response to his trouble with the leftists within his 
administration replaced all the original members of the PNDC and began to approach the 
right point of view. "On all major issues of the conflict between the right and the 
government, the PNDC now intervened in the political process on behalf of the right and 
capital while at the same time taking punitive measures against individual and particular 
members of the petty bourgeoisie against whom it had particular grievance. This gave the 
impression that it was still on the 'left' course."20 While the PNDC clouded the lines of 
distinction between left and right politics, it became crystal clear that the peasants and 
19 Ibid., 131. 
20 Hansen, 199. 
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workers would bear the brunt of Ghana's new economic policies. Currency devaluation 
put prices for common goods out of the reach of ordinary people. “The call for workers 
participation in management resulted in insubordination.”21 There were massive layoffs as 
budgets were streamlined and cuts in government spending caused transportation, 
education and health prices to soar. "A reversal on the urban-rural terms of trade favored 
the population in the countryside at the expense of the residents of the main cities."22 
Ghanaian citizens reacted to this hardship in two ways. First there was vocal 
opposition to state economic policies. Student groups and trade unions began a series of 
strikes. Student groups such as the National Union of Ghanaian Students (NUGS) gave 
voice to the discontent felt by those who opposed Rawlings' decisions but who were more 
reluctant to protest openly. Among their demands were full liberalization of the state, 
greater accountability of administrative heads and the NUGS complained about 
government corruption once again becoming rampant. Similarly as the defense committees 
were abolished workers did not have a venue by which their grievances could reach state 
ears. Trade unions gained the strength of numbers previously held by the defense 
committees and began to protest for their members demanding job security and wage 
adjustments to cope with a harsh economy. These worker groups questioned the 
authority of the government and demanded democratic reforms so they could be ensured a 
voice in determining their economic future. 
21 E. Gyimah-Boadi, ed., Ghana Under PNDC Rule (Dakar: CODESRIA Book Series, 1993), 
329. 
22 Chazan, Liberalization, Governance and Political Space in Ghana , 132. 
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A second reaction to Ghana's economic condition was for people to withdraw 
from state life and to form cooperatives to develop goods and services for themselves. 
The informal sector grew as entrepreneurs independent of the state began to meet the 
needs that the PNDC did not. Voluntary groups provided health and educational services. 
Displaced workers meet local demands for sanitation and housing care. Networks were 
developed to reroute agricultural production to the market areas. "By the mid-1980's it 
was estimated that the informal sector accounted for fully 85 percent of employment in the 
country."23 A new elite class emerged and there was significant restructuring of Ghana's 
socio-economic activity. This new relationship developed independent of the state and 
while "neither ignoring its presence nor rejecting its significance, disputed the centrality of 
its authority."24 
The second Phase of Rawlings rule is thusly noted by the marked separation of 
state and popular institutions. Social organizations (trade unions, student groups, 
entrepreneurial cooperatives, etc.) accumulated wealth apart from the government. This 
allowed the elites and the populous who served under them a status particular to their 
organization. Cultural differences defined and were shaped by this activity as value 
systems dictated rules of operation which governed their performance. The state 
witnessed a degree of prosperity of its own. The IMF and the World bank were pleased 
with Ghana's adherence to the structural adjustments they imposed. The relationship 
between external lenders and the state has gotten closer and "foreign visitors to Ghana are 
23 Ibid., 134. 
24 Ibid. 
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impressed with the availability of consumer goods,"25 even if the populous doesn't benefit. 
As external lenders put more money into government coffers, state agencies have been 
able to fortify themselves without having to give forum to popular demands unless forced 
to by a strike or other protest. State administrators were able to give the appearance of an 
improving economy even though most Ghanaians were outside of it. This separation of 
political spaces based on independent economic foundations set the stage for Ghana's 
political future. 
Phase III 
The PNDC was forced to address the question of state legitimacy by 1987. If the 
masses of people in a country have gone outside the official arena for even the most basic 
of services and have engaged in structuring political networks that don't involve the 
country's government, what is the reason for having a central administration? Rawlings 
was confronted with the wide disparity in income between state employees and informal 
groups and was embarrassed that the economic plans that had been implemented 
highlighted this inequity. Political reform had been curtailed for so long, the Ghanaian, 
population questioned the state's representative legitimacy and the PNDC ran out of 
excuses. It became readily apparent that not only did the ERP not liberalize Ghanaian 
politics but it hindered the states ability to be crucial to the everyday fives of its people. 
Clearly the pressure was on Rawlings to refocus on the political aspects of development 
that he had neglected since 1983. "A third phase of political reordering ensued, one in 
25 Hansen, 201. 
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which the government attempted to gain control of political spaces by correlating its 
populist notion of people's power with participation in formal institutions."26 Politics was 
to be emphasized as well as economics and the PNDC made moves to make the central 
government more accessible to its people. Rawlings noted that “Ghanaians should know 
from the history of this country and other countries that the greatest enemy of democracy 
is a weak and chaotic economy...Democracy can be secured only on the foundations of a 
strong, viable and efficient economy.”27 
The first action was the July 1, 1987 establishment of the National Programme for 
Economic Development. The acknowledged goal of this plan was to acknowledge the 
harshness of the ERP. "Besides detailing production goals, the new plan underlined the 
importance of the human face of structural adjustment."28 Implicit in this plan was the 
need to work for long-term changes in both the political and economic sectors of 
Ghanaian life. 
The second action specifically spoke to the political pressures on the PNDC. 
District Assembly elections were proposed whose stated goal was to "democratize state 
power and advance participatory democracy and collective decision-making at the 
grassroots."29 These local elections were supposed to build rural support for the state 
while at the same time not offending the desires of urban dwellers. The district assembly 
26 Chazan, Liberalization, Governance and Political Space in Ghana, 136. 
27 Ayee, 108. 
28 Ibid., 136. 
29 Ibid. 
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elections were to meet the representative needs of the citizenry as this activity was 
supposed to give life to a people's government that would operate within the PNDC. By 
undertaking these two actions the PNDC was to solve two problems at once. It would 
satisfy the desires of common people to have a voice in governmental affairs by 
liberalizing the state both economically and politically and the legitimacy of the 
government's position would be strengthened. However, this was not the case as many 
issues came to light. "Preparations for the local elections, which included a prolonged 
voter registration exercise and the delimitation of electoral districts, took over eighteen 
months."30 The months before the December 1988 elections saw the government receive 
further funding and extended credit from external donors which served to exacerbate the 
economic division between state and society. Prices continued to rise and the population 
still bore the burden of structural adjustment. 
The economic hostility that the populous felt was matched by political coercion, 
"the PNDC continued to employ repressive measures, violate human rights, and curtail 
freedom of speech and assembly."31 Ghana's democratic exercise was carried out under 
quite undemocratic circumstances. Urban associations, who the PNDC thought would not 
be incensed, were vocal in their opposition. These groups saw local elections as an 
underhanded attempt of the PNDC to consolidate its power base with the end purpose of 
regaining hegemonic control of Ghanaian citizens’ lives. Within this stressed political 




election results reflected the discontent felt by the citizenry. "The final results indicated a 
record number of candidates standing for office (12,842) and, for Ghana, an 
extraordinarily high turnout of 58.9 percent. Not insignificantly, participation rates were 
substantially higher in the remote Upper East and Upper West regions (62 percent and 67 
percent respectively) than in the Greater Accra region (44.3 percent), Kumasi (45 
percent), or Legon (11 percent)."32 The higher rural participation rates represented the 
lack of faith urban dwellers had in the electoral process. It is then evident that instead of 
ease social conditions, the elections highlighted the cleavages present in Ghanaian politics. 
Nonetheless, the renewed focus on political development and electoral activity that 
emerged during Phase III reshaped Ghanaian politics for Phase IV going into the 1990s. 
Phase IV-Present 
In January of 1990 Rawlings inaugurated the NCD to prepare a draft constitution 
for Ghana. “The NCD is to function as an electoral commission and assist in developing a 
programme for a more effective realization of democracy in Ghana.”33 At the conclusion 
of the District Assembly elections the populous was impatient with local substitutes for 
meaningful democratization and demanded the formation and structure of substantive 
democratic institutions. The publication in early 1991 of the NCD’s proposals for a return 
to civilian rule understandably did very little to reduce these demands. 
32 Ibid., 137. 
33 Ayee, 111. 
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The Rawlings’ regime emerged from the District Assembly exercise with renewed 
credibility and engaged in a “democratic transition that was consonant with the kind of 
governance for development advocated by the World Bank.”34 Rawlings claimed he 
wanted to shift the focus of political power from Accra to the localities, advocated 
political dialogue and promised new avenues for popular participation. Opponents of the 
regime argued that Rawlings simply sought to “create a firmer platform on which to 
ground his own monopoly.”35 Rawlings’ opponents had good reason to be skeptical 
because as Rawlings’ regime was predicting the positive nature of things to come, his 
security wing was engaged in destabilizing the sources of opposition. “While Justice 
Annan was extolling the virtues of consensus, which he perceives as being deeply 
embedded in Ghanaian cultures, Arnold Quainco mounted the rostrum after the Boahen 
lectures and threatened a ‘conflagration’ if opponents of the government did not mind 
their tongues.”36 
Following the NCD proposal, Rawlings accepted the National Democratic 
Congress (NDC) nomination in mid-September of 1991. The climate leading up to the 
presidential elections in December of 1992 and immediately following was one of 
mistrust. The NDC accepted that most Ghanaians held the electoral process as 
fundamental to democracy in Ghana and it insisted that elections themselves were not 
34 Ho-Won Jeong, “Ghana: Lurching Toward Economic Reality,” World Affairs Vol. 159 No. 2 
(Fall 1996): 68. 
35 Paul Nugent, Big Men, Small Boys and Politics in Ghana: Power, Ideology and the Burden of 
History 1982-1994 (London: Pinter Publishing Limited, 1995), 178. 
36 Ibid., 178. 
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enough. “The technocrats sincerely believed that they had brought the country back from 
the brink of disaster and that their good work would be undone if power fell into the 
wrong hands again. Equally the securocrats had reason to worry about a settling of scores 
if they forfeited control over the coersive apparatus.”37 Encumbered with the commitment 
to democratic reform while fearing what that reform could bring the NDC made a few 
concessions to the opposition before the December elections resulting in a brief period of 
political ease. “Multi-party reform was ushered in with the completion of a new 
constitution, the unbanning of political parties, the emergence of the private press, three 
new human rights organizations, and the release of remaining political detainees.”38 It was 
thought that the hard times of adhering to the ERP were finally coming to an end and a 
mood of hope and expectancy swept the nation. Rawlings promised continuity and “his 
rivals promised employment, economic prosperity, respect for the rule of law and 
restitution and retribution for the years of military rule.”39 
This positivity was not to last and the political euphoria soon degenerated into a 
climate of mistrust. Rawlings was elected with 58 percent of the vote40 amid much 
contention. While international observer groups such as the OAU, the Carter Center and 
the Commonwealth Observer Team held that the elections were free and fair, the 
opposition groups “agreed the register was faulty with around 1 million ghost names, 
37 Ibid., 185. 




while many legitimate voters were not registered.”41 The four opposition parties-The New 
Patriotic Party (NPP), the People’s Convention Party (PCP), the National Independence 
Party (NIP), and the People’s Heritage Party (PHP) boycotted parliamentary elections 
believing they had lost due to NDC dishonesty. Donor nations urged dialogue between 
the government and the opposition and Rawlings realizing that such dialogue was 
important to give his newly elected state legitimacy urged opposition parties into a 
dialogue in his first address to Parliament. Rawlings also committed that a new electoral 
register would be completed before the 1996 elections and that an ID card system would 
be in place. Realizing that their boycott had placed them outside the decision making 
process and facing an eroding support base, the Inter-Party Coordinating Committee 
announced that it would “tolerate the present institutional arrangement and seek to play an 
active role as an extra parliamentary opposition body.”42 
Having been elected Rawlings now faced the challenge of discarding the radical 
military dictator image and now struggled to be seen as an elected president of a 
constitutional democracy. As such he attempted to create a climate of tolerance in society 
and at the same time, a private press emerged with a strong independent voice. Among 
others, The Ghanaian Chronicle, the Independent, The Statesman and The Voice sprung 
up bashing Rawlings and growing to enjoy a circulation of about 130,000 per week.43 The 
41 Ibid. 
42 Nugent, 179. 
43 Ofori, 35. 
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private press attacked Rawlings, his wife and senior NDC staff and the NDC attempted to 
be tolerant to offer evidence to foster the belief that it would abide by the rule of law.44 
The Rawlings regime was repeatedly criticized for not acknowledging the suffering 
of ordinary Ghanaians, but all major parties were firmly committed to the logic of 
capitalist accumulation and accepted the inequality this would entail. The NDC insisted 
on the primary importance of maintaining the momentum of the reform program and 
“accepted that this inequality would always exist, the trick was to ensure that social order 
was as meritocratic as possible.”45 Then Minister of Finance and Economic Planning Dr. 
Kwesi Botchwey introduced a budget intended to commit the regime to an acceleration of 
its divestiture program so that its objectives may be fulfilled quickly. 
By the middle of 1994, the attention of all of Ghana’s political parties was directed 
at the national elections in 1996. “The National Electoral Commission (NEC), under the 
chairmanship of Dr. Kwadwo Afari-Gyan, was able to bring the parties together to thrash 
out agreement on the terms under which these elections would be tested.”46 Unlike 
before the 1992 elections, the political parties came much closer to what each would 
regard as a free and fair election. For instance, they agreed that voters’ identification 
cards would be issued with photographs to curb voter registration fraud. During this time 
it again became apparent that the NDC would wield with full force the advantages of its 
44 In a notable exception, George Naykene, the editor of The Christian Chronicle was convicted 
of criminal libel and jailed for 18 month for publishing an article that suggested that Rawlings and his 
former AFRC took bribes from Hilla Limann before Rawlings handed over the government to him in 
1979. 
45 Nugent, 181. 
46 Ibid., 276. 
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incumbency. As a result of the opposition parties not being in the financial position to 
advertise and pay salaries, many staffers from the opposition defected to the NDC. These 
deserters saw the lack of resources by the opposition as ill fate for the election and did not 
want to be on the outside of the power structure. 
However, lack of resources did not stop the opposition from being a force to 
contend with. The NPP claimed a victory of sorts following the District Assembly 
elections of 1994 asserting the NDC had suffered defeat in Ashanti and the Eastern 
Region. Similarly, the PCP moved to consolidate its strength by uniting the different 
groups believing in Nkrumah’s political vision. The NDC suffered a series of setbacks 
which gave the opposition strength as well. Allegations of corruption and 
mismanagement of state services surfaced and the press alleged that the dishonesty of the 
past was returning as a result of Rawlings still being in power. “More surprising was the 
impact of a series of sex scandals.”47 Dr. Botchwey was said to have fathered a child to 
the former Canadian High Commissioner in what was said to be a breach of national 
security and then Vice -President K. N. Arkaah was alleged to have had sex with a 
schoolgirl.48 
Another setback for the NDC was the mishandling of the conflict in the Northern 
Region. The Konkomba were placed under the authority of the Dagomba, Gonja and 
Nanumba chiefs during colonial times and have since pressed for land and autonomy. 
Conflict had erupted in 1981 and threatened to do so again but the Regional Minister, Lt.- 
47 Ibid., 277. 
48 Ibid. 
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Col. Abdulai Ibrahim denied the possibility existed. In February 1994 violence ensued in 
which 144 villages and over 1000 people had been lost. The Rawlings regime was blamed 
by both sides for having fueled the underlying conflict and for being too slow in its 
reaction. “The Konkomba Youth Association claimed that Dr. Mohammed Idn Chambas 
(the MP for Bimbilla and First Deputy Speaker of Parliament) had actively armed the 
other side. On the other side, the militant faction of the allied forces blamed Rawlings for 
having given the Konkomba the impression that it sympathized with their cause.”49 It was 
widely accepted that the NDC would not receive support from the Northern Region in the 
1996 elections. 
Contributing to the ill will directed at the NDC, Dr. Botchwey introduced the 
Value Added Tax (VAT) in March of 1995. Demonstrations, strikes and general unrest 
were directly related to its introduction. The state argues that the sector with the largest 
amount of resources is thus empowered to secure the greater economic growth and “the 
high and expanded level of taxation has the net effect of transferring financial resources 
from private hands into government hands.”50 E. K. Vorkey counters that “it is now 
established as a scientific fact that there is a large degree of inefficiency endemic in 
government operations in every country in the world...This inefficiency is particularly 
pronounced in developing countries such as Ghana because of too few managers of high 
training and skill in the public sector.”51 On June 2nd members of the Ghana Traders 
49 Ibid., 278. 
50 E. K. Vorkeh, “A Working Solution” West Afiica (12-18 June 1995): 922. 
51 Ibid. 
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Union Association “closed their shops for five days to back their demand for the 
withdrawal of VAT” and demonstrations in Accra, Kumasi, Tamale and Ho resulted in the 
deaths of 4 people.52 These protests led the government to repeal the VAT Act in June . 
In a move to strengthen their position prior to the elections two opposition parties 
announced an alliance. The NPP and the PCP in August of 1996 announced that “the two 
had agreed on all essential aspects of the alliance, including their partnership in 
government.”53 Supporters of both parties had come to accept that only an alliance of 
this nature would unseat the 15 year incumbency of Rawlings. It was expressed that if this 
alliance had not materialized, thousands of opposition supporters would not even bother 
to vote. The Secretary-General of the NPP Agyenim-Boateng explained the importance of 
opposition unity by saying “Politics is a game of numbers and whoever gets the biggest 
number wins the race and we feel that the advantage of incumbency that Rawlings has, 
having been in power for almost 15 years gives him might.”54 John Agyekum Kuftior 
emerged as the Presidential candidate and the call went out to the people for support. 
Abraham Ossei Aidooh, the NPP parliamentary candidate for Tema West constituency 
offered that “we must fight and save this nation from the hands of a man who had brought 
the office of the President into disrepute and also protect the nation from total collapse.”55 
Similarly Dr. Francis Agyare-Bray, NPP parliamentary candidate for Akwatia constituency 
52 West Africa ( 8-14 January 1996):21. 
53 Ajoa Yeboah-Afari, “The Great Alliance” West Africa (2-8 September 1996): 1396. 
54 Ajoa Yeboah-Afari, “The Year of Decision” West Africa (8-14 January 1996): 13. 
55 Ghana Review International (December 1996), accessed 20 March 1997; available from 
http://www.ghanareview.co.uk/Newsreel/96/12/14/NEWS9.HTM; Internet. 
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admitted “the Great Alliance did not believe in empty promises but Ghanaians should give 
the NPP/PCP a chance on December seven and then decide on their own the difference 
between the NDC and the Great Alliance.”56 
After heated campaigns, the NDC’s access to state resources overwhelmed the 
resources of the Great Alliance and Rawlings was re-elected president a second time with 
57.2 percent of the vote57. The NDC swept the election gaining 130 parliamentary seats 
to 59 for the NPP, 5 for the PCP and one for the PNC. Rawlings and the NDC was again 
given the mandate by the Ghanaian peoples to govern the nation for another four years. 
The electoral process was held as free and fair by the OAU observer team.58 Ghanalert (a 
non-governmental human rights organization) similarly evaluated the elections while 
noting that there were some problems such as “impersonation, particularly by under-age 
children, logistical problems such as inadequate seals and indelible ink to major ones like 
inadequate ballot papers.”59 
While the 1996 elections were widely praised, some opposition candidates voiced 
malcontent with the results. For example Cecilia Eguakun, the NPP parliamentary 
candidate for Dade Kotopon constituency demanded a recount of votes cast in her race 
56 Ghana Review International (December 1996), accessed 20 March 1997; available from 
http://www.ghanareview.co.uk/Newsreel/96/12/14/NEWS3.HTM; Internet. 
57 John Agyekum Kufiior of the NPP won 39.9% and Edward Mahama of the PNC won 3.0%. 
Africaonline (1996), accessed 6 June 1997; available from 
http://www.Ghana.africaonline.com/AfricaOnline/Newsstand/elections96/main.html; Internet. 
58 Ghana Review International (December 1996), accessed 20 March 1997; available from 
http://www.ghanareview.co.nk/Newsreel/96/l 2/14/NEWS9.HTM; Internet. 
59 Ghana Review International (December 1996), accessed 20 March 1997; available from 
http://www.ghanareview.co.uk/Newsreel/96/12/14/NEWS7.HTM; Internet. 
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claiming that she is “convinced that some of the figures declared must have been 
fictitiously bungled up thereby giving bizarre and questionable results.”60 In a like manner 
M.K. Adusah NPP parliamentary candidate for Berekum alleged that “after the electoral 
officer had transferred the date of the various polling stations to the final results sheets, his 
coordinator noticed that one Maaboah had made an alteration on the sheet with a 
corrective fluid”61 and refused to sign the final results. In contrast to the above 
complaints, Edward Mahama of the PNC conceded defeat by congratulating Rawlings and 
praising the Great Alliance for their professional conduct “adding the victory for 
democracy is victory for all Ghanaians whether we win political power of not.”62 
Withstanding isolated complaints, Rawlings and the NDC moved into their second 
term of office with an agenda that focused on strengthening Ghana’s economic future and 
enhancing Ghana’s role in the political arrangements of West Africa. Rawlings accepted 
victory by offering that “the elections do not belong to any single party but the whole 
country considering the peaceful and transparent manner the exercise was held.”63 He also 
sought to reassure foreign investors by explaining that “Ghanaians demonstrated that they 
60 Ghana Review International (December 1996), accessed 20 March 1997; available from 
http://www.ghanareview.co.nk/Newsreel/96/12/14/NEWS8.HTM; Internet. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ghana Review International (December 1996), accessed 20 March 1997; available from 
http://www.ghanareview.co.uk/Newsreel/96/12/14/NEWSl l.HTM; Internet. 
63 Africaonline (1996), accessed 6 June 1997; available from 
http://www.Ghana.africaonline.com/AfricaOnline/Newsstand/elections96/main.html; Internet. 
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are peace-loving people and that the country would remain peaceful to attract more 
investors. 
That Rawlings seeks to be more involved in the political machinations of the 
region is most plainly seen by citing Ghana’s role in the ECOWAS65 military operation 
towards returning democracy to Sierra Leone following the May 25, 1997 coup by Maj. 
Johnny Paul Koromah. Ghana’s foreign Minster, Victor Gbeho said that “Ghana was 
committed to the ECOWAS operation in Sierra Leone and was already deploying troops 
to enhance the ECOWAS forces already stationed in Freetown.”66 
The political transition made by Rawlings and the economic alterations that the 
nation underwent for the past 15 years has earned Ghana praise for being “one of the 
continents two sustained and comparatively successful efforts at economic reform.”67 
Observers have noted that “in Africa, Ghana has been the only conspicuously successful 
liberalizer out of a large number of authoritarian and single-party regimes.”68 
64 Ibid. 
65 Economie Community of West African States. 
66 Afiicaonline (1996), accessed 6 June 1997; available from 
http://www.Ghana.africaonlme.com/AfricaOnlme/Newsstand/electians96/main.html; Internet. 
As of this writing Koromah has shown significant signs of weakening and admitted that his group lacked 
the firepower to withstand another clash with Nigerian led ECOWAS troops. 
67 Thomas Callaghy, “Africa: Back to the Future” in Economic Reform and Democracy ed. Larry 
Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins, 1995), 109. 
68 Barbara Geddes, “Challenging the Conventional Wisdom” in Economic Reform and 
Democracy ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins, 1995), 62. 
82 
While Ghana’s political history is still being written it is clear that the commitment 
to democracy via the electoral process has a firm standing in Ghana. The opposition 
remains vocal and serves as a constant check to NDC politics. An analysis of Ghanaian 
politics specific to the hypothesis of this work will follow in the conclusion, yet Gyimah- 
Boadi encapsulates Ghanaian politics thusly: “It was often the PNDC’s odd ability to 
appear populist, preemptively deal with popular issues on its own terms and co-opt 
popular leaders that allowed it to push ahead with the neoliberalization of the Ghanaian 
economy and society.”69 
69 E. Gyimah-Boadi, 22. 
CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
A people are already trapped in spirit when they agree to the 
use of things to hurl themselves separately against eachother. 
The root of the disease is not in the things themselves but in 
the use of things; the disease is not in the abundance of 
things but in relationships growing between users. The 
people using all things to create participation, using things to 
create community, that people have no need of any healer’s 
art, for that people is already whole. 
Ayi Kwei Armah - Two Thousand Seasons1 
The preceding discussion (Chapter 3) has identified individualism, social equity and 
political democracy as three ideals fundamental to western democracy. It is the purpose 
of this work to gauge the applicability of these three ideals to Africa’s political reality and 
to facilitate such, this work has outlined the social group, the leadership style and the 
politicized military as three phenomenon that comprise African politics. This final 
comparison will show 1) if it is individualism or the social group which is dominant in 
African politics, 2) whether the leadership style of African governments lend themselves to 
socially equitable practices, 3) will politicized militaries give way to politically democratic 
practices and 4) which set of ideals has observable dominance in Ghana. 
1 Ayi Kwei Armah, Two Thousand Seasons (Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books, 1973), 129. 
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Individualism - Social Group 
Chapter 4 has already proven that is it the social group which is the primary 
political unit. Suffice it here to reiterate that since colonialization up to the present time 
social organizations, be they linked by kinship, language, sex, age or profession have never 
ceased to be the vehicle of political activity for African peoples. As African governments 
continue to alienate and disenfranchise individuals to the point where pre-existing social 
phenomenon must gain dominance, joining and forming social groups becomes a basic 
survival technique. Language, family/clan, gender, age and profession become points to 
organize around so that individuals may have insulation from state oppression, both 
physically coercive and economic in nature. In such a socio-political environment, 
individualism becomes isolation and cannot be nurtured. This work therefore concludes 
that sub-hypothesis (a) is correct. 
Social Equity - Leadership Style 
Having understood Chapter 3’s contention that social equity implies equality of 
opportunity within the state we can turn to the discussion in Chapter 4 and view that the 
leadership style adopted by the heads of state emerging out of independence was one 
where autocratic decision making was politicized. Thus favoritism and nepotism was the 
dominant practice as the social groups in favor with the heads of state and their ministers 
benefited while those out of favor bore the brunt of state harshness. The distribution of 
scarce resources (jobs, goods, social services, etc.) is frequently guided by political 
patrimony rather than merit. Leaders, be they heads of state or the ministers of various 
85 
agencies often allocate resources to social groups whom they favor. Their own culture 
group will be the recipient of more services than another group who has been their historic 
rival. Certain groups in a political society are almost constantly alienated (e.g. woman’s 
groups) for various social reasons (e.g. sexism). Such inequity in distribution creates 
divisions in societal conditions where certain social groups are systematically kept from 
benefiting from state resources. Such discrimination makes the outlook for the democratic 
notion of social equity via equality of opportunity become dim. In that this phenomenon is 
observable in the machinations of African states this work holds that sub-hypothesis (b) is 
true. 
Political Democracy - Politicized Military 
The aforementioned discussion has shown that political democracy entails popular 
participation via elections. This work has also shown that instead of elections the coup 
d’etat has been a most common method of political power transfer in Africa. Where the 
military has been politicized by its officers to the point where it takes an active role in the 
political course of the state and often seizes control with the expressed goal of restoring 
order, elections are not an option. In these all too frequent cases, those in control of the 
means of coercion are now in control of political power as well. Often the military states 
that it is moved to seize control of the state with the stated purpose of forcing entrenched 
leaders to hold elections and as the case study shows, the military itself becomes more 
entrenched than the regime they deposed. Elections are began only when social groups 
are able to press their desire to be represented in the streets, the courts or through 
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affecting the economics of the nation. Under such societal pressure, elections are 
frequently held under unfair conditions and the outcomes are disputed. In the absence of 
elections and in the wake of disputed results, social groups in some instances withdraw 
from the formal sector and devise their own leadership constructs so they may compete 
with the state for resources. We may therefore conclude that sub-hypothesis (c) is not 
true. A politicized military does stand as an impediment to popular participation but that 
politicization does not necessarily mean that there will never be elections while the military 
hold office. There are repeated instances exemplified by Malawi, Niger, Kenya and the 
case study of this work that prove where the politicized military is effectively pressed by 
the populous of the nation and it runs out of often repressive or economic options, it may 
concede to hold elections. Elections held under forced circumstances may be the topic of 
another work but the fact that the elections are held is enough to disprove sub-hypothesis 
(c)- 
Case Study Observations 
Having divided contemporary Ghanaian politics into four distinct phases, it may 
now be determined if western democratic ideals can find expression in this particular 
environment. To facilitate this inquiry this work will separately investigate the three 
western democratic ideals to determine their applicability in the Ghanaian context. 
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Individualism? 
Given the economic and political pressure exerted by the state onto ordinary 
citizens in all four phases, we may clearly view that individualism can find no home in the 
Ghanaian context. In the face of such pressure, the populous retreated from the reach of 
the state and created a detailed informal sector to provide the goods and services that the 
state could or would not. It is readily apparent that the extensive formation of social 
collectives was elemental to this activity. New unions were created and existing cultural 
connections were strengthened. These social groupings were used to ensure survival from 
economic hardship and a tool by which the disenfranchised could critique the state. In 
such a context, to foster the western democratic belief that individual success would 
ensure the prosperity of the state would translate into isolation from an extended network. 
Unity of numbers is strength and the stronger the bonds, the better the group is able to 
withstand state pressure. The chaotic economic condition was reason enough but state 
repression provided further pressure to coalesce. The defense committees that were 
established during Phase I were supposedly created to provide a measure of popular 
participation. While investigative bodies, tribunals and women's groups are examples 
where the goal matches reality, the defense committee's also included mobilization squads 
whose goal it was to "carry out a campaign against what it considered to be the enemies of 
the revolution. These included former government officials as well as traders, 
professionals and entrepreneurs. The techniques employed in this connection were 
particularly repressive: killings, incarcerations, public beatings, and summary trials were 
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commonplace."2 This hegemonic style of rule is evident throughout the PNDC's tenure. 
Those who stood out were persecuted as Akata-Pore's arrest and Atim's flight from the 
country exemplify. Even as district assembly elections were held the state continued its 
violent campaign against its detractors. The hegemonic manner in which Rawlings 
consolidated his power is a study in how a head of state may isolate his administration 
from outside pressures. Threats were accessed by the PNDC on a group level. 
Suppression was meted out economically by group (all those outside the PNDC) and 
individual persecution that accompanied such provided the lesson to the populous that 
only by the strength of the group did they survive. 
Earlier analysis showed that in the beginnings of the western democratic state, 
individuals formulated governments to ensure their unobstructed freedom to enjoy the 
fruits of society. It is the observable tendency of African governments and in particular 
the Ghanaian state to structure governmental activity to benefit the members of a selected 
group, be they an ethnic class or an economic elite. As external donors forced stringent 
economic measures upon Ghanaian administrators it was the PNDC that prospered 
economically. As the economy improved, the PNDC and those allied to it benefited as 
other groups were forced outside the official economy to fend for themselves. This group 
separation is the most distinguishing characteristic of Ghanaian politics. That social, trade 
and professional groupings were caused to coalesce so concretely is the prime example 
that the group became the primary political unit. While one may allow that social 
groupings are ultimately divisible into the desires and hopes of its individual members, it is 
2 Chazan, “Liberalization, Governance, and Political Space in Ghana”, 127. 
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the prevailing phenomenon of group organization which proves most influential in 
Ghanaian politics. 
Social Equity? 
We have noted that the western democratic notion of social equity is predicated on 
the equality of opportunity that individuals have in society. Furthermore we have also 
seen that a western democratic state is primarily concerned with the equality of its citizens 
as the citizens assert their individuality. We have just concluded that it is the group not 
the individual which is primary to Ghanaian politics so once we replace the individual 
citizen with the African group and explore if Ghanaian politics has been concerned with 
questions of equality of group opportunity, we are able to answer in the negative. 
Throughout Ghanaian history and certainly during the tenure of the PNDC we are able to 
note how fundamentally inequitable the country's socio-economic and political life has 
been. 
The manner in which Ghanaian social groups were concretized in reaction to the 
harsh economic reality provides primary evidence of the basic inequities in Ghanaian life. 
We have observed that colonialism gave birth to Ghanaian eiltes who gained their position 
through their proximity to the colonial means of production. These eûtes consolidated 
their positions after independence as the colonial productive factors were bequeathed to 
them by the British. Throughout the political upheavals of the late 1960's and 1970's, 
control over the mode of state production changed sparingly. The masses of people 
90 
disenfranchised by colonialism remained in the peasant classes and at low administrative 
levels. The ERP of the 1980’s had the stated goal of curing Ghanaian economics yet its 
net effect was to further divide the populous and the state. While we have observed that 
the informal sector grew to levels where it created its own elite structure, its level of 
prosperity still paled in comparison to the state. The Ghanaian people while providing for 
their basic needs for existence were still able to view the successes of state administrators 
as they continued to receive external money based on their economic oppression of the 
masses. This fueled the level of discontent among the disenfranchised. The state 
prospered as the people suffered and from Phase II to Phase in we are able to note further 
cleavage. The rural dwellers were the main beneficiaries (however not to the extent of the 
state) of the economic machinations. This caused the urban population to voice their 
discontent. "Middle-class urban groups, still smarting from the indignities suffered after 
the 1981 takeover and resentful of the influx of expatriates in the form of IMF and World 
Bank consultants, did not hasten to cooperate with the government. They were joined by 
the trade unions and the students who in a series of strikes began to express their explicit 
opposition to regime politics..."3 These opponents of the government occasionally 
complain that it is dominated by the Ewe ethnic group. The President and many of his 
closest advisers are Ewe, but many ministers are of other ethnic origins. The inequities in 
Ghanaian economic and political life and the resulting observable conflict show that the 
notion of equal opportunity in society has often been replaced by a leadership style that 
emphasizes preferential treatment over standardized practice and nepotism over merit. 
3 Ibid, 132. 
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Political Democracy? 
It is when investigating the prospects for popular participation through elections 
where the hopes for democracy become most realistic. The strength of the informal sector 
and protests against the government had undermined the state’s legitimacy to the point 
where Rawlings has been forced to hold regular elections to appease the public. 
As we examine the recent history of Ghanaian politics we are able to view 
numerous instances where popular participation has been curtailed invoking the ire of the 
masses. The military coup has been a dominant and overbearing factor in the nation’s 
political history. When emerging from the colonial era Nkrumah was declared president 
for life in 1962. This set the die as Nkrumah established a one party state. If his 
opponents were to receive a voice in politics they would have to forcibly remove Nkrumah 
from office. Thus the coup that expelled Nkrumah in 1966 set the standard for military 
incursions instead of the electoral process. Throughout the 1970's the military has 
intervened to overturn the election of Busia as well as previous coup results. Rawlings led 
not one but two assaults on Accra. PNDC I moved to consolidate its power by crushing 
all dissenting voices. Leftist groups such as the JFM and the NDC were assaulted and 
virtually dissolved. The NDM was forced to accept the political hegemony of the PNDC 
and its economic policy. "A 'culture of silence' had set in, one that left the people aloof 
from government and the vision of popular democracy more remote than in the past. 
Thus, structural adjustment at this juncture was not accompanied by any significant 
movement toward political reform."4 PNDC II was so secure in its hegemony that it was 
4 Ibid, 133. 
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able to shift focus away from political reform altogether. The complete adoption of the 
ERP imposed on Ghana by western lending institutions reflected the change in priorities 
from the political to the economic. The defense committees that were supposed to be 
institutions which provided for popular participation were dismantled or reorganized to 
strengthen the PNDC’s bureaucracy. The creation of the NCD was the lone political 
offering of the time and its role was purely theoretical. The political thoughts that the 
NCD engaged in either did not include a timetable for elections or that schedule was 
ignored. “Plans for the decentralization of administrative authority and decisionmaking 
responsibilities did not proceed beyond the dissemination of written documents. And the 
NCD devoted more attention to redrawing electoral districts than to elaborating a new 
model of civilian rule.”5 It is not until five years later that district assembly elections were 
held. The PNDC in phase n was characterized by the concretized fracture between the 
state and society. As the state augmented their apparatus and the populous built their own 
associations, elections were a distant prospect. The elections that occurred to begin 
phase III were held as suspect by many of the groups that the Rawlings administration 
hoped to appease. The PNDC thought to give rural citizens the elections they desired 
without offending urban professionals. Quite to the contrary professional associations saw 
these elections as a rouse to consolidate state power and mobilized to that effect. That 
this conflict arose following an electoral exercise showed state ineffectualness in entering 
the informal sector and thus illustrated the state of political democracy in Ghana until the 
early 1990’s, “...the dominant mood in the country was one of impatience with populist 
5 Ibid, 132. 
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and local substitutes for real and meaningful democratization. People are waiting for 
populist spectacles to be replaced with the structures and substance of democracy.”6 
Rawlings 1992 election and subsequent re-election in 1996 provide concrete examples of 
the state of electoral reform improving. 
While the prospects appeared dim leading up to the early 1990s the last five years 
has seen Ghana improve substantially upon its electoral record. The ability to hold 
peaceful and largely ‘free and fair’ presidential and parliamentary elections from 1992 
through 1996 has made Ghana a shining example for other nations struggling to adopt 
democratic practices. Ghana has proven itself to be a political rarity in the African 
continent as the incumbent Rawlings was reelected to a second term. Adding further 
inspiration Rawlings and his NDC has shown increasing tolerance toward political 
opposition in the country. The U.S. Report on Ghana's Human Rights and Judicial 
Records in 1996 cautions that with respect to the individual, civil liberties, political and 
workers rights it “highlights a hesitant' judiciary, the use of excessive force by the security 
services, official harassment of the media, and violence against women as particular 
problem areas.”7 That same report also found that there was no observable abuse of laws 
regulating public protests, no political killings and no forced exile showing that the 
government encourages citizens abroad, including dissidents with valuable skills to return 
6 Ibid, 137. 
7 Africaonline (1996), accessed 6 June 1997; available from 
http://www.Ghana.afiicaonline.com/AfiicaQnline/Newsstand/elections96/main.html; Internet. 
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home.8 Therefore while certainly having much ground to cover on the road to sustainable 
democracy, the state of politics in Ghana has shown marked improvement. 
Hypothesis verification 
Having found that sub-hypothesis (a) and (b) held true while sub-hypothesis (c) did 
not, this work concludes that the main hypothesis is true, western democracy is 
incompatible with the nature of contemporary African states. That popular participation 
is fundamental to western styled democracy and is observable in African politics is not 
viewed as a conflict which would disprove the hypothesis in any sense. Rather, the 
presence of the electoral process held under the conditions particular to politics in Africa 
is seen as the evidence of a democracy styled after African political phenomenon and 
indicative of a distinct stylization of democracy unique to Africa. This type of democracy, 
ideologically different from the ideals of western democracy and unique to African nations 
must take hold on the continent if Africa is to better itself in the 21 st century. 
This work submits that the only type of democracy that will prove viable in 
African circumstances is one whose beginnings reflect the ideological foundations of the 
African mindset. One need only to review Africa’s history to gain examples of practices 
that could be adaptable to Africa’s contemporary political reality. Chancellor Williams 
notes that in ancient societies such as Egypt, Ghana, Mali, Songhay and Mossi, “what we 
8 Ibid. 
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now call ‘democracy’ was generally the earliest system among various peoples throughout 
the ancient world.”9 Williams elaborates that democratic institutions evolved and 
functioned in a socio-economic system which Western writers call ‘stateless’ or ‘societies 
without chiefs’. It is certain that democratic practices permeated Africa long before 
colonization.10 The leaders of Africa need only to pluck from their historical tree to 
choose the elements of a new African democratic construct. 
Cheikh Anta Diop has proved that in observing African civilizations through time 
there have been observable similarities that may be expounded into an African democratic 
model. Among these commonalties (but not exclusive) are clanic organization, civilian 
power and limited leadership terms. Diop explains that the clan is a social organization 
“whose purpose is to meet the economic needs”11 of its members. The clan is built of 
kinship ties often matriarchal in nature and serves as the organizational conduit by which 
members may relate to each other. The clan unites with other clans for the purpose of 
marriage, for incest was a taboo, and as such their destinies become entwined; they unite 
into a large clan, a tribe. The tribe imites with other tribes and together they build a larger 
organization, the nation-state, to ensure their survival and prosperity. This type of family 
oriented unity could serve as the basis of a new African democracy. 
9 Chancellor Williams, The Destruction of Black Civilization: Great Issues of a Race from 4500 
b.c. to 2000 A.D. (Chicago: Third World Press, 1987), 162. 
10 Williams even goes so far as to propose the theoretical composition of an African constitution 
and a declaration of Human rights drawn from various customs, p 170-175. 
11 Cheikh Anta Diop, Civilization or Barbarism: An Authentic Anthropology, trans.Yaa-Lengi 
Meema Ngemi (New York: Lawrence Hill Books, 1991), 111. 
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Emerging from this national construct, civilians wield the balance of power in the 
society. “Military aristocracy is practically absent, and in normal times, the soldiers play 
only an unobtrusive, if not nonexistent, political role.”12 African nations could abolish any 
standing army not necessary for national defense. A national guard type of condition 
would take place where soldiers would don uniforms only in times of crisis, working 
normal jobs during times of peace. This would eliminate the looting and stealing plaguing 
many African armies. 
The function of leadership could then be seen as a duty rather than a privilege. 
Specific terms of leadership would be subscribed and their adherence would be rigid. 
Diop notes that in some societies rulers were put to death after having reigned for a 
specific time. “Most recently, in 1967, a young Nigerian “prince”, a college graduate who 
had accepted the “royal” duty of his tribe, became a victim of this practice.” The end of 
the terms of leadership would be pre-determined and nonconformers would be punished. 
These three points have been illustrated here not to prescribe a govenmental 
construct for the whole of Africa. These possibilities have been raised here to show that 
many of the customs held by African peoples before colonization could be adapted into 
viable democratic institutions for Africa’s future. The search for and adherence to a new 
political paradigm will certainly be a struggle for the people of Africa but so have the years 
since Africa’s independence. 
When, if ever, the black people actually organize as a race in 
their various population centers, they will find that the basic 
and guiding ideology they now seek and so much need is 
embedded in their own traditional philosophy and 
12 Ibid, 129. 
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constitutional system, simply waiting to be extracted and set 
forth. 
Chancellor Williams13 
13 Williams, 162. 
Appendix A 
As the word itself is Greek in origin there exists an unstated supposition that the 
concept of democracy is Greek. Noted western scholars widely begin their inquiry into the 
evolution of democracy with Greece and cite 5th century b.c. Athens as the “ fundamental 
source of inspiration for modem western political thought”.1 It is the intent of this work 
to question the fundamental principals of democracy so a brief digression to investigate 
the Greek origin of the concept is necessary. 
The world has debated varied systems of governance since man’s inception. 
Humanity was bom in East Africa’s Great Lake region around the Omo Valley2 and man 
emerged as a social being and went on to populate the world. Man’s social relation to his 
counterparts has been a central theme of world civilization and we can view this debate in 
all the major cultural movements of the world, particularly in Africa. The Twa people of 
the Great Lakes region moved up the Nile and used their belief systems to found ancient 
Kemet (Egypt)3. Kemet emerged as a cosmopolitan society with constant interaction with 
the Nubians of the south and under periodic pressures from various forces such as the 
Hyksos of the Northeast went on to influence African civilization4. This influence is 
1 David Held, “Democracy,” in The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World, ed. Joel Krieger 
(New York; Oxford University Press, 1993), 220. 
2 Cheikh Anta Diop, Civilization or Barbarism: An Authentic Anthropology, trans. Yaa-Lengi 
Meema Ngemi (New York; Lawrence Hill Books, 1991), 11. 
3 Cheikh Anta Diop, Precolonial Black Africa, trans. Harold Salemson (New York: Lawrence Hill Books, 
1987), 218. 
4 Diop, Civilization or Barbarism, 129. 
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evident in the political practices and the cosmogonies of the Dogon and the empires of 
Mali, Songhai and Ghana. These nation-states stand as testament to Authentically African 
systems of governance. This point will be elaborated later in this work but does serve to 
show that the western concept of democracy did not enter Africa within a political 
vacuum. The Persian invasion of 525 b.c. and Alexander’s conquest of Egypt represents 
not only the oppressive victory of western culture over Africa but it evidences African 
social and political thought being injected into Ancient Greece and from Greece to Rome 
to Europe and on to the rest of the world. George G. M. James in his timeless work 
Stolen Legacy proves that Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and many other philosophers that 
have influenced western thought did their schooling in the universities of Egypt that 
Alexander’s occupation forced open and as such Greek philosophy is stolen 
Egyptian/African philosophy. 
James notes that Egypt was a closed society and that the Egyptian 
Education/Mystery system was secret order where “membership was gained by initiation 
and a pledge to secrecy.”5 Teaching was therefore delivered orally to students 
(neophytes) who were forbidden to commit their lessons to paper. Secret systems of 
writing were developed so that the lessons could be preserved for all time. These books 
comprised the wealth of practical, theoretical and metaphysical knowledge present in the 
Egyptian Education/Mystery system and were housed in grand libraries and temples. 
5 George G. M. James, Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy Is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy 
(Trenton: Africa World Press, 1954), 4. 
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“After nearly five thousand years of prohibition against the Greeks they were permitted to 
enter Egypt for the purpose of their education.”6 
The Persian invasion forced Egyptian society open and non-Egyptians were 
allowed to study under the priests of the schools. “The Greeks gained possession of the 
land and access to the Royal Library through the conquest of Alexander the Great.”7 
The Royal Library was plundered, its halls ransacked and its books were stolen to be co¬ 
opted by Aristotle, who was a close friend to Alexander, and his students. “Aristotle’s 
plan to usurp Egyptian philosophy was subsequently carried out by members of his 
school.”8 Aristotle and his school went on to compose works on metaphysics, the 
doctrines of physicists and histories of arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and theology. 
“These men’s works. . .form the nucleus of a compilation which has been called the 
history of Greek philosophy.”9 James asserts that Aristotle’s school “helped themselves 
to the books” of the Royal Library as they were “a portion of the booty.”10 As such 
Aristotle’s writings on ethics, economics and politics which were so instrumental in 
forming the Greek city-state from which we derive our notions of democracy, were copied 
by him from the Library of Alexandria. James illustrates: “The fragmentary character of 
6 Ibid., 41. 
7 Ibid., 42. 
8 Ibid., 14. 
9 Ibid., 18. 
10 Ibid., 45. 
101 
Aristotle’s writings and their lack of unity, reveal the fact that he himself made notes 
hurriedly from books while doing his research at the great Egyptian library.”11 
The stolen knowledge of Africa was in turn stolen from Greece by Rome. “When 
Athens was captured by the Romans in 84 b.c. the books were captured by Sulla and 
carried to Rome where Tyrannio, a grammarian, secured copies and enabled Andronicus 
of Rhodes to publish them.”12 These books went on to influence the thought of all of 
Europe who purposefully forsake their African heritage. The Roman emperors 
Theodosius in 4 AD and Justinian in 6 AD forced the Egyptian schools to close and 
condemned all remnants of their teaching. This act established Rome as the cultural center 
and all vestiges of their African beginnings were abolished. 
Noting the tainted history of Greek knowledge at least forces us to question if 
democracy was first bom in 5 century b.c. Athens under the tutelage of Aristotle, a 
historically proven plagiarist. We could conclude that democratic thought, just as all other 
philosophy was stolen from African society and converted to suit the needs of Greek 
peoples. This point has been elaborated here to force the issue that the history of western 
democracy is a partial history and to illustrate that the western democratic ideals reflected 
in this work are perverted African concepts. The conclusion of this work will assert that a 
return to the original concept is central to Africa’s political future. 
Just as Africa has been shown to anciently influence Greece in all manner of 
science both physical and social, in contemporary times, we can most clearly note the 
11 Ibid., 126. 
12 Ibid. 
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reversal of these roles. Western nations and institutions are forcing the African continent 
to accept the paradigm of democracy as the desired mode of operation. As Africa 
struggles to conform to this model, this works seeks to investigate the nature of 
democracy. 
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